By Fatmanour Chouseinoglou [Edited by Todd Ballantine-Morris & Claudia Brooker]
When questioning the modernity of a six hundred-year-old empire with frontiers across three different continents, it is vital to avoid making any generalisations through comparisons with European empires. Historians have marked the transition from one historical period to the next with influential European events, such as the Renaissance as the transition point from the medieval to early modern period.[1] For the Ottoman Empire which cannot be considered purely European due to its extensive territory, however, these set time frames cannot be used to judge whether it was a medieval or early modern empire. Instead one must analyse its modernity based on the characteristics of an early modern or medieval state. The characteristics Wiesner-Hanks discusses in Early Modern Europe can be used to generate criteria for an early modern state. According to Wiesner-Hanks, centralised political institutions, such as a developed bureaucracy and technological developments contributing to an efficient army are the political characteristics of an early modern state.[2] Additionally, encouraging developments in education, trade and international connections, along with religious and ethnic tolerance all seem to be significant features.[3] Hence, this essay will judge the modernity of the Ottoman Empire by analysing its political, military, economic and social aspects with accordance to the criteria mentioned above. It is important to discuss each aspect from the beginning (c.1299) to the end of the empire (1923), in order to identify developments that may affect its modernity throughout its lifespan.
Firstly, the early form of the Ottoman government can be considered rather medieval. The founder of the Ottoman dynasty, Osman, can be described as a chief, who gained recognition and support through his local victories against the Byzantines, rather than a sultan, as his influence was mainly limited to followers in the Bursa province.[4] Regardless, ‘fifteenth century chronicles’ suggest he attempted to establish an early form of government by distributing land and authority to his family and entourage.[5] This mode of administration, however, was undeveloped and later terminated during the rule of Murad I from 1362, suggesting the absence of a strong sense of political organisation that is vital for an early modern state. It was only after the expansion of the empire through the territories acquired starting from Murad I’s reign, that a developed sense of bureaucracy became a major player in Ottoman politics. Conquerors, such as Evrenos and the Chandarlis, took on roles as ‘military leaders and political advisors to the sultan’, the first being Hayreddin Hilal during Murad’s reign, who came to be known as the first grand vizier and passed on the position to his descendants until 1453.[6] The grand vizier became the de facto ruler of the sultanate, dealing with its everyday administration and overseeing officials beneath him.[7] Ottoman lands were divided into different sections, allowing for an easier administration and centralised control over the extensive territories. For instance, villages were divided into timars, which were overseen by cavalrymen and government officials, who paid tribute to the sultan through taxes or military service.[8] In addition, the sultan exercised control in northern Anatolia and the Balkans (c.1450) through ‘vassals and semi-independent marcher lords’, though the influence of marcher lords had decreased significantly by 1512.[9] Although these arrangements suggest the existence of a centralised administrative government, which is a characteristic of an early modern state, in essence, it was a system that followed the same principles of European feudalism, thus proving the presence of medieval structures within Ottoman administration.
Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the administrative government became increasingly developed by the twentieth century. A diagram presenting the ‘organisation of the civil bureaucracy and its relation to the palace’ in 1908, in Findley’s Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire shows the availability of various official positions that a medieval state would not have.[10] For instance, the empire’s justice, finance and education systems were overseen by the Council of Ministers, which was supervised by the grand vizier, who was under the control of the sultan. Other than the Council of Ministers, the grand vizier presided over the Council of State, the Foreign Ministry, and the Ministry of Interior. The need for an effective Foreign Ministry is evidence of the transition from warfare to diplomacy when dealing with foreign affairs from the eighteenth century onwards.[11] The signing of various treaties with other European polities can be used as primary evidence to prove the Ottoman’s attempts in improving foreign relations. As stated in the Treaty of Passarowitz in 1718 between the Ottoman sultan Ahmed III and Habsburg Emperor Charles VI, the two empires ‘entered into and concluded for 24 Lunar Years’ a ‘Treaty of Peace and Friendship’.[12] The construction of the German Fountain in Istanbul to commemorate German Emperor Wilhem II’s state visit in 1898 can also be considered as a symbol of improved foreign relations. The inclusion of both Sultan Abdul Hamid II’s tughra and Wilhelm’s emblem was supposed to be a representation of this friendship.[13] Despite the developed governmental board and increase in foreign diplomacy, Hanioglu seems to be sceptical of eighteenth-century governance of acquired territory. He argues that the empire became increasingly decentralised, with the growth of independence in territories like Tunisia, after 1705, and a decrease in control over the Arabian Peninsula, limiting Ottoman rule to the Hijaz, the Persian Gulf and ‘coastal areas along the Red Sea’.[14] Overall, it is clear that Ottoman administration carried early modern features, as there was an established state bureaucracy, which developed over time, and periods of centralised control regardless of its decline in its later years. The modernity of this area, however, was clearly affected by time and new territorial acquisitions.
As the Ottoman Empire is classified as a ‘Gunpowder Empire’ in much of Middle Eastern historiography, it is apparent that the Ottoman military underwent developments that aided its transition from medieval to early modern. [15] It is vital to consider areas, such as recruitment, tactics and weaponry to understand and judge the extent of modernity within the military body. The first, and most prominent method of recruitment was through the devshirme practice. This method was one where young boys, usually those who had not yet experienced puberty, were taken from their rural Christian families, often from the Balkans, and put into military households to be trained for military or royal service.[16] They were usually trained as Janissaries, which ‘were an infantry corps’ and often the ‘sultan’s personal bodyguard.’[17] The widespread awareness of this practice is demonstrated through fourteenth century Italian humanist Caluccio Salutati’s statement that the Ottomans ‘seize[d] boys of ten to twelve years for the army’.[18] In 1493, Bayezid II passed a decree regularising this practice of collecting ‘prisoners for imperial service’ through successful raids. The decree outlined the number of boys that could be gathered for the use of individual commanders – a total of twenty-five – while the rest were to be taken to be put in military households.[19] The practice of devshirme can be compared to the Abbasid recruitment of Turkish slave military elites, who were also isolated from the local population.[20] In this sense, this method can be classified as a medieval one due to its similarities with the medieval practices of the Ottomans’ predecessors.
As mentioned, the second main form of recruitment was through the timar system, which was introduced during Murad I’s reign. Timar holders were those who were granted lands by the sultan in order to provide for their livelihood, in return for their military service as sipahi cavalrymen whenever it was required.[21] Although this was a successful method in maintaining a constant supply of soldiers and an early example of systematic conscription, again, it was based on the medieval practice of feudalism, and thus could also be considered a medieval method of recruitment. The later decline of the timar system towards the end of the sixteenth century, however, which gave way to paid soldiers, may suggest a transition to an early modern form of recruitment. Initial tactics that the Ottoman military used were also quite primitive. Imber indicates that Osman’s forces used mounted archery as their main military tactic, who attacked by surprise and retreated to defend themselves.[22] This was a fairly medieval tactic, widely used by Osman’s predecessors. The 1400s saw the emergence of raiders, or Akinjis, who were soldiers that raided areas with the purpose of scaring and weakening their opponents in the lead up to a major campaign. These raids were described by Konstantin Mihailović, who was in the ‘Ottoman army between 1453 and 1463’, as he states that ‘wherever [raiders] strike, they burn, plunder, kill and destroy everything,’ giving a sense of barbaric and unsophisticated warfare. [23] The raider remained a part of Ottoman warfare until 1595.[24]
The area which saw the most development within Ottoman military was undeniably the weaponry. While early Ottoman troops used ‘bows, swords, shields and small axes’, their encounter with cannons in the Balkans during the 1830s gave rise to technological developments and the adoption of cannons by the Ottomans in their sieges from the 1420s.[25] The Ottomans were quick to master gunpowder weaponry, as they had an abundant supply of saltpetre, a vital resource for the making of gunpowder, allowing the Ottomans to produce higher quality gunpowder.[26] In order to ensure effective and continuous supply, the Ottoman sultan also introduced the Corps of Armourers, a central supply system, which was responsible for the ‘manufacture and maintenance’ of weaponry.[27] This shows evidence of a centralised system within the army as well, which is significant considering centralised governance is an important feature of an early modern state. Besides guns and cannons, gunpowder was also used as an explosive in underground tunnels in order to destroy bastions of opposition fortifications.[28] Moreover (though initially limited) the Ottomans managed to establish a naval power consisting of ‘armed galleys’ that, according to Wiesner-Hanks, effectively enabled them to maintain control in the Mediterranean.[29] Consequently, although the Ottomans adopted gunpowder technology later than most European empires, it was able to maximise its use of military technology to its fullest in order to strengthen their military power and transform its military from a medieval to an early modern one.
In terms of Ottoman economy, it would be reasonable to argue that it functioned on rather medieval systems. In addition to the presence of feudalism, the Ottoman economy was mostly agrarian and pre-mercantilist, even during the transition from the nineteenth to twentieth century.[30] Consequently, it does not seem to be an area that developed with the passing of time. Taxation seems to play a major role in generating revenue for the Ottoman central government, whether this was through the cizye, ‘a poll tax on non-Muslims’ under Muslim authority, or tax farming, known as the iltizam system.[31] The idea of tax-payment also varied according to different regions and occupations. For instance, in Sayda, Arabs paid a cash tax on ‘wheat and barley to local state depots’, while farmers in Mosul gave half of their produce to state depots, and tribesmen paid their tax according to ‘the number of tents or herds they owned.’[32] Although the process of taxation is not itself an early modern feature, as it existed in various forms during the medieval period, the clear and organised nature of tax collection in local areas suggests that the Ottoman ideas of tax collection were in some ways developed.[33]
When it came to trade, the goods and trading partners were both influential in how developed trade was. For instance, trade revolving around grain or food produce were more strictly regulated, especially those produced in the Izmir region of the empire. The produce obtained in this area were usually used to provide for the local population and were forbidden from being exported, in order to avoid creating competition between Izmir’s and Istanbul’s food supply.[34] Coffee trade, on the other hand became a major source of income between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. The merchants of Ottoman Cairo, obtained a ‘quasi-monopoly over the Red Sea trade’ because of the growing popularity of coffee in both the Ottoman and European world, due especially to its close links with Yemen, which was one of the main providers of the trade.[35] Furthermore, the textiles industry became an increasingly thriving market, which the Ottomans benefitted from due to Egypt’s active role in this market. The flax in Egypt was known to be of good quality, allowing the linen produced in this region to increase its popularity among foreign countries, especially following the development of international trade routes due to improved maritime technology between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries.[36] The cloth produced in Egypt eventually reached further markets, evident through the 120,000 pieces of cloth that were sent to France annually by the end of the eighteenth century.[37] It was through popular trading markets, such as the textiles industry, that we can see a real sense of global interconnectedness throughout this period. Although, the Ottoman economy seems to be a bit more backward in terms of tax collection, the increased global relations through various trading industries, suggests that this area of the economy can be considered as early modern, following the development of technologies allowing for an increase in foreign trade.
As the society makes up a significant portion of the empire, it is important to judge the modernity of social institutions within the Ottoman sultanate. In order to do so, it is worth examining the attitudes towards different social groups and the developments in social institutions, notably education. It can be argued that the Ottoman Empire was more tolerant of other religious and ethnic groups in comparison to European empires, placing it, in a sense, one step ahead of the rest of Europe. While religious wars were not unheard of in European societies, the Ottoman Shari’a and sultanic law recognised and protected the Muslims, dhimmis – people of the Book, such as Jews and Christians, living under Islamic authority – and musta’mins, who were non-Muslim foreigners living in the sultanate.[38] The Ottoman Constitution of eighteen-seventy-six, also demonstrates this in Article Eleven, states that ‘while maintaining [Islam as the state religion], the state will protect the free exercise of faiths professed in the Empire, and uphold the religious privileges granted to various bodies, on condition of public order and morality not being interfered with.’[39] Governance over different religious groups was enabled through the Millet system, in which each community belonged to their own millet and was managed by a chosen leader of the same background, in return for a specific tax, the jizya.[40] As a result of this system, other religious groups, namely Jews and Christians, were able to manage their own affairs with accordance to their religious beliefs.[41] Furthermore, non-Muslims were given the opportunity to hold high levels of authority, as evident with Mehmed the Conqueror’s treatment of the patriarch following the conquest of Istanbul. Mehmed gave the new patriarch ‘civil and religious authority over all Christians under Ottoman rule’ ranging from those in the Balkans to those in Palestine and Syria.[42]
In terms of treatment of women, it can be argued that women were treated better than they were in Europe, but this was still very limited. For instance, the position of Valide Sultan – the Queen Mother – was one of the most influential positions within the imperial court. Not only was the Valide Sultan the head of the sultan’s harem, but was also able to make ‘political, financial and military decisions’ for the empire if the sultan was a minor.[43] Although this example is specific to a women of high position, the extensive power she had within the court is still worth noting. In the later years of the empire, we can see various educational reforms, attempting to encourage different areas of study. For instance, a technical school was opened for military officers in order to enable maximum contribution to future military success.[44] Additionally, starting from the mid-fifteenth century, madrasas – religious schools – became attached to mosques. Those who wished to become an important judge or imam had to attend madrasas especially established by the sultan.[45] Overall, it is evident, that the Ottoman Empire was tolerant of various religious groups and encouraged educational reform, both being characteristics of an early modern state.
In conclusion, it is clear that different areas of the empire were compatible with the characteristics of an early modern state outlined in the introduction, to different extents. For instance, while its extensive tolerance of different communities and increasingly developed bureaucracy were clearly examples of what an early modern state would look like, the continued reliance on feudal systems, such as the timar landholdings, indicate that some medieval practices were not absent from Ottoman governance. It would, however, be unreasonable to ignore early modern developments and conclude that the Ottoman Empire was medieval due to some medieval practices, as these were mostly limited to the earlier years of the empire. With the development of various technologies, including cannons and naval technology especially, the Ottoman military and trade modernised and improved too much to be ignored. Hence, it would be reasonable to conclude that the Ottoman Empire can be considered as an early modern state within its own time frame, especially when compared to its medieval predecessors. It is undeniable that it modernised at a slower pace in certain areas in comparison to European empires and outside the traditional time frame set in European history, but by no means is this an indication of the absence of any kind of modernisation.
Notes [1] Merry Wiesner-Hanks, Early Modern Europe, 1450-1789, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 2. [2] Wiesner-Hanks, Early Modern Europe, p. 273. [3] Wiesner-Hanks, Early Modern Europe, pp. 116, 219, 273, 348. [4] Metin Kunt, “Ottomans and Safavids: States, Statecraft and Societies, 1500-1800”, in Youssef Choueiri (ed.), A Companion to the History of the Middle East (Malden: Wiley-Blackwell, 2005), p. 192. [5] Colin Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650: The Structure of Power (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 128. [6] Imber, The Ottoman Empire, p. 129. [7] Wiesner-Hanks, Early Modern Europe, p. 347. [8] Wiesner-Hanks, Early Modern Europe, p. 116. [9] Imber, The Ottoman Empire, p. 27. [10] Carter V. Findley, Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 241. [11] Kunt, “Ottomans and Safavids”, p. 203. [12] “The Treaty of Passarowitz” in Samuel Whatley (ed.), A General Collection of Treaties of Peace and Commerce, Manifestos, Declarations of War, and Other Public Papers from the End of the Reign of Queen Anne to the Year 1731 (London: 1732) <https://archive.org/details/generalcollectio00lond/page/400> [Accessed 7 August 2020]. [13] “Tales of Turkey” (2019) German Fountain – Sultan and Emperor | Istanbul – Tales of Turkey. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l-2xGsc1oBs> [Accessed 7 August 2020]. [14] Sukru Hanioglu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2008), pp. 6-11. [15] Linda Darling, “Political Change and Political Discourse in the Early Modern Mediterranean World”, The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 38 (2008), p. 522. [16] Kunt, “Ottomans and Safavids”, p. 198. [17] Imber, The Ottoman Empire, p. 256. [18] Imber, The Ottoman Empire, p. 134. [19] Imber, The Ottoman Empire, pp. 132-133. [20] Reuven Amitai, “The Mamluk Institution, or One Thousand Years of Military Slavery in the Islamic World”, in Christopher Brown and Philip Morgan (eds.), Arming Slaves: From Classical Times to the Modern Age (London: Yale University Press, 2006), p. 44. [21] Imber, The Ottoman Empire, p. 256. [22] Imber, The Ottoman Empire, p. 252. [23] Imber, The Ottoman Empire, pp. 260-262. [24] Imber, The Ottoman Empire, p. 265. [25] Imber, The Ottoman Empire, pp. 267-268. [26] Suraiya Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It (London: IB Tauris, 2004), p. 111. [27] Imber, The Ottoman Empire, p. 268. [28] Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It, p. 111. [29] Wiesner-Hanks, Early Modern Europe, p. 348. [30] Hanioglu, Late Ottoman Empire, p. 19. [31] Linda Darling, Revenue-Raising and Legitimacy: Tax Collection and Finance Administration in the Ottoman Empire, 1560-1660 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996), p. 17. [32] Hanioglu, Late Ottoman Empire, p. 9. [33] Kunt, “Ottomans and Safavids”, pp. 197-198. [34] Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It, p. 53. [35] Nelly Hanna, Ottoman Egypt and the Emergence of the Modern World: 1500-1800 (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2014), p. 67. [36] Hanna, Ottoman Egypt, p. 73. [37] Hanna, Ottoman Egypt, p. 79. [38] Hanioglu, Late Ottoman Empire, p. 19. [39] “The Ottoman Constitution” (23 December 1876), The Ottoman Constitution of 1876 – ANAYASA.GEN.TR <http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1876constitution.htm> [Accessed 7 September 2020]. [40] Wiesner-Hanks, Early Modern Europe, p. 116. [41] Wiesner-Hanks, Early Modern Europe, p. 428 [42] Wiesner-Hanks, Early Modern Europe, p. 428. [43] Wiesner-Hanks, Early Modern Europe, p. 348. [44] Wiesner-Hanks, Early Modern Europe, p. 348. [45] Wiesner-Hanks, Early Modern Europe, p. 445.
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