By Robin Alexander Plant [Edited by Fatmanour Chouseinoglou & Zhara Adal]
This essay will compare and contrast how the Spanish and Ottoman Empires responded to reduced central authority at the start of the eighteenth century, as well as how they responded to the negotiation of their empire’s borders and peripheral regions with other world powers and local actors, especially in relation to global conflicts. Further, the changes they made to administrative and military organization in response to these challenges from home and abroad. Reforms in commercial trading were particularly important for the Spanish Empire, whereas the Ottomans focused mainly on the military and challenges to central authority. Finally, it will look at how they responded to the rebellions in South America and the Balkans. Moreover, whether these challenges amounted to the emergence of nationalist movements or were responses to policies of the metropole, in their search for resources to ensure they maintained modern armies, in a time when international conflicts were testing the ability of empires to hold onto their territorial possessions. Throughout this essay it will be argued that the main point of comparison between the Ottoman and Spanish Empires was their shared desire to exploit and maintain control of the peripheral regions of their empires. In response to the shared view that they needed, at all costs, to update their military in terms of strategy and technology. In this manner both reflect the ‘developmental cycle’ in which power is centralized, decentralized and then attempts are made to recentralize it.
The Ottoman and the Spanish Empires of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were both experiencing what historians have termed ‘developmental cycles.’ A process in which centralization of power is followed by a loss of control at the periphery of the empire, usually followed by an attempt at recentralization.[1] By 1700 the Ottoman central authority had lost control of Egypt, Syria, Mount Lebanon and North Africa, to ‘ayan’ (regional actors).[2] Throughout the eighteenth century there was a further ‘assault’ on the traditional religious customs of the Ottoman empire. The Wahhabi movement, which was strongly conservative, emerged alongside the Sufi movement which favoured ‘mystical teachings,’ both becoming entrenched in their traditions.[3] It is interesting to note that the Wahhabi movement appealed to a ‘return to the golden age’ rhetoric rather than looking to modernize through reform, highlighting the variety of responses to the crisis. Peripheral leaders adopted ideas and built their own forms of Muslim life, attempting to ‘assert their own brand of modernity’ and challenging that of the sultan.[4] Moreover, the Wahhabis seized ‘the Holy Cities’ and removed the sultan’s names from prayers, demonstrating how serious their threat to the Sultan’s authority was.[5] Therefore, this is one of the ways in which the Ottoman Empire’s central authority began to lose control of the periphery of their empire before 1820. Although, this is not the end of the challenges that they would face in trying to control disparate groups.
The Bourbon state, in the late seventeenth century, was experiencing a ‘low point’. Charles II’s (1665-1700) reign was defined by ‘military defeat, bankruptcy, intellectual regression and famine.’[6] This weakness resulted in the challenge of ‘internal forces’ to the monarchy that limited the effectiveness of the central monarchy. Coming to the throne as a child, Charles II was unable to rule himself, hence his mother initially took control as Council of Castile.[7] Due to challenges to the central authority, during her reign the court began to resemble more of an ‘oligarchy or monarchical republic’ than the centralized system of Philip IV (1621-1640), Meaning both the Ottoman and Spanish central authorities were being challenged.[8] The Ottoman Empire was experiencing this in the form of new ideas emerging in the external areas of the empire, in the process of developmental cycles, whereas the Spanish crown was experiencing internal divisions that would still require a reinforcement of central authority, after the stable rule of Philip IV, which can also be viewed in the developmental cycle framework.
Charles II’s death resulted in the Spanish War of Succession (1700-1713), with Phillip of Anjou, emerging victorious with French backing. The Treaty of Utrecht (1713), confirmed opponents’ fears, and Spain was stripped of its ‘European possessions’ so Britain and Portugal were able to dominate the African slave trade thereafter.[9] As a result ‘commercial access for the French to the New World’ was ensured and the asiento was agreed, which gave the English a ‘monopoly contract to import slaves.’[10] From 1715 to 1738, more than sixty English ships entered the commercial post set up in Buenos Aires by the South Sea Company, sending larger ships than authorised and disrupting the market in 1722, 1726, 1729 and 1731.[11] Furthermore, despite increasing the population, legal import consumption remained low.[12] Upon Philip V’s (1683-1746) accession to power, the issues remained similar: how to increase tax revenues from the America’s, protection of the empire and expansion of commercial relationships. All of which relied on administrative reform. On top of this remained the need to improve the military.[13] Therefore an absolutist rule was asserted with Catalonia and Valencia having privileges revoked, taxes and laws were brought under central control, the aristocracy and tercios were excluded and removed in the case of the latter and fiscal reforms to increase revenues were introduced.[14] Therefore, the Spanish Empire, asserted monarchical sovereignty to recentralize power during the eighteenth century, by revoking powers of Catalonia and Valencia and ensuring other factions within government, aristocracy and tercios were unable to challenge the central authority. Taking power from the periphery, reflecting the developmental cycle.
After its defeat to the British in the War of Jenkins Ear (1739-1749) or Guerra del Asiento, (the war started because of the asiento policy), the Spanish monarchy wanted to rebuild ‘income and honour.’[15] Due to the loss of European possessions, reliance on their colonies in America was now great.[16] The War of Jenkins Ear was a ‘watershed’ moment for colonial trade, as Spanish possessions in South America and the Caribbean were forced to obey ‘by registros,’ indicating ships must sail under a licence from Cadiz.[17] Furthermore, in a 1750 peace treaty the South Seas Company ‘renounced the asiento and the right to annual trader,’ returning the Spanish ‘unrestricted’ commercial monopoly.[18] Loss of power in Europe, challenges to power in the New World, combined with a need for military and bureaucratic reform meant the Spanish needed to pursue the resources from their empire’s periphery by increasing taxes and subjugation. This meant ‘development’ in the Indies, more efficient exploitation of colonial exports and expansion of colonial markets were key to help Spain ‘participate again as a great power in European affairs.’[19] Bayly, however, argues ‘the lines of battle were drawn’ in the colonies as a result of this policy of exploitation, between Creoles and imperialists. Before exploring the resistance of the colonies, it is important to detail bureaucratic and economic reforms of both the Spanish and Ottoman Empires that were introduced and, crucially, the military motivations that lay behind these.
During the reign of Selim III (1789-1807) there was an overhaul of the Ottoman central government, provincial administration, military and naval institutions, which were motivated by ‘foreign war and internal disturbances.’[20] Only three years after becoming sultan, Selim III had succumbed to defeat at the hands of the Russians, with the Iasi Peace Treaty signed 29 December, 1791. This secured the Black Sea dominance for Russia, strengthening their geopolitical position in the Caucasus and Balkans; furthermore, giving ‘right of patronage to the Christians of the Balkan Peninsula.[21] It was within this context that Selim III decided reform was needed. Selim experimented with military reforms attempting to introduce European tactics and weaponry, however, he came up against great opposition from his Janissaries; who ‘staunchly opposed any European-style system.’[22] Furthermore, despite sending foreign officers to gain experience in France on ‘European military science,’ the Janissaries still refused to drill and train these techniques.[23] Regardless, Selim III was still successful in creating an army that was 23,000 strong but it was never seriously used, suggesting his authority lay not in the implementation but in promulgation.[24] Similarly, naval power grew greatly under Selim III but lacked the ‘experience’ and excluded Greek islanders, who would have proved useful, on religious ground.[25] As stated, the Ottomans were motivated by a desire to catch up with the modern developments in military tactics. Yet, there remained a more important reasoning for reforms to military institutions: the control of peripheral spaces of the empire.
Charles III (1759-1788) came to power when the Spanish monarchy was ‘committed to reform,’ especially in relation to colonial trade, which they became completely reliant on due to it outperforming the domestic economy.[26] Domestic industry had been decimated by ‘poor tariffs and excise duties,’ while agriculture and industry were not developed. There was, however, a success in the introduction of an absolutist state and territorial exploitation.[27] The fallout of the Seven Years War (1756-1763), meant that by 1765 the Caribbean islands were opened to trade with ports of the peninsula. Further improvements were made in reforms, such as, palmeo (measuring custom duties by cubic volume) being abandoned by a ‘6 per cent ad valorem’ duty on exported goods.[28] In the following years there was an abandonment of the ‘Cadiz staple and the fleet system,’ allowing ‘individual merchant vessels’ to trade. Alongside this was the abolition of restrictions on New Spain and removal of the Caracas monopoly, which allowed colonial commerce to flourish.[29] Unfortunately, disaster struck throughout the rest of the empire as prices plummeted as a result of this influx of goods.[30] Furthermore, if measured by value, the ‘metropolitan share’ of exported goods was extremely low in comparison to that of the colonies.[31] Therefore, although the colonies were excelling, Spain was not. In the meantime, other European powers still dominated exports to the Americas. The colonies were the main source of resources to be exploited to meet the demands of the Spanish crown, hence that is what they did. The recentralization of military and administrative power was the most obvious way to do this, especially in conjunction with other European powers’ emerging military strength. Exploitation however led to a build-up of resentment towards the metropole from the colonies.
The Ottoman Empire was taking up economic reforms as well. Finance ministers proposed the abolition of timars, the almost complete removal of the malikâne system and liquidation of internal debt of economic stability.[32] Furthermore, they looked for new avenues of tax collection. For example, they considered retaining tax farms from deceased holders and introducing new taxes on alcohol and cotton. There were attempts to reform the administrative system with a ‘major reorganization of provincial administration.’[33] Twenty eight provinces were created and ruled by the Grand Vizier, however, military and fiscal weaknesses meant the enforcement against ‘insubordinate governors, defiant notables and local dynasties’ was difficult.[34] During this period, both empires were trying to reform their economic and administrative systems, specifically those in the periphery of their empires, in an attempt to gather the resources to compete on an international stage and fund their armies.
Territorial expansion and the drive for resources for a more advanced military drove much of the crisis in Spanish South America. Since the start of the eighteenth century the tericos had declined into ‘local militias commanded by nobility’, whilst other European powers consolidated power in large standing armies.[35] José de Gálves was the first general of new Spain and from 1775 the secretary of the Indies. It was during his reign that imperial policy took a new aggressive drive, with an expansionist policy that grasped the California coastline and provinces of New Vizcaya.[36] Furthermore, they removed the Portuguese from Sacramento, Britain ceded Florida Pensacola and Sonara, and Texas and California were consolidated, as it was essential they were able to defend against foreign and internal attacks.[37] They repelled the British from Buenos Aires and then ensured the loyalty of the Creole elite through military titles and legal privileges.[38] This new expansion was reliant on the existence of a strong army, to protect the empire from the British on the northern frontier and the threat of Russia from Alaska. Finally the Spanish were now reliant on their colonies for financial stability, consequently, in 1770 they made up twenty three per cent total revenue rising by 1.2% until 1780.[39] Therefore, the Spanish found themselves in a position in which they extended their territorial boundaries, which required a larger army, which in turn required more resources from their colonies, resulting in their further exploitation and alienation of locals, for which an army was needed to quash. This was a financial and military spiral that would prove difficult to manage.
As stated earlier, one of the greatest threats to the power of the sultan was the Janissaries, who despite their outdated tactics and technology, refused reform. In the face of European military expansion this presented a major problem for the sultan. Further evidence of this desire to protect against peripheral actors and internal threats can be seen in The Deed of Alliance of the Empire of Trust (1808). This was signed by all powerful actors in the empire., in which they pledged to ‘protect the sultan and sultanate’, recruit men for the new state army and collect taxes.[40] Although not enacted, what this does demonstrate is the sultan’s fears of revolt and desire to create a new army. Therefore, in attempt to strengthen the army and the state, Selim III looked to squeeze the population of the Balkans for resources needed for the military reforms.[41] It was the ‘vindictiveness’ of this search for military resources that angered the population of the Balkans.[42] Thus, for both the Spanish and Ottomans, the search for resources for military expansion and desire to strengthen central authority, led to the alienation of the populations of these areas and crises in their ruling.
The failure of both empires to quell the unrest in their colonies without violence, falls into the wider debate surrounding the emergence of nationalism in former colonies. Adelman argues, convincingly, that imperial revolutions were not the ‘rise of the nation’ but responses to international and civil conflict of the time.[43] Nonetheless, The Andean Rebellion (1780-1783) has been viewed as a consequence of an emerging nationalist feeling among the population, spurred on by the writings of exiled Jesuits. The Andean Revolt is an interesting example, as ‘policies of the king’s ministers’ created ‘outrage and dissolution,’ specifically in response to the reparto system which affected all of the population.[44] Furthermore, the need for taxes became even greater for the Spanish upon entering war with Britain in 1779, causing a rise in sales tax from two to six per cent.[45] The Spanish crown had expelled Jesuits in 1767 and banned the teachings of their doctrines of popular sovereignty.[46] Despite this, writers such as Francisco Javier Clavijero Echegaray, went to Italy after being expelled and wrote a ‘pre-Columbian’ history of the ‘Mesoamerica and the central Mexican altiplano.’[47] He was responding to the enlightenment writings of Comte de Buffon, Peter Kalm, Cornelius de Pauw and Abbee Raynal, who asserted that the Americas had contributed nothing great to the world and was a place of backwardness.[48] Therefore, this combination of nationalist pride born out of exiled writers and the deteriorating conditions of those living in the colonies meant it was a space ripe of rebellion.
There have been similar theories about the rise of resistance to Ottoman rule in the Balkans. It is argued that it was emerging feelings of nationalism that spurred the ‘unremitting unrest’ in the Balkans from the 1790s onwards.[49] Conversely, none of these revolts had ‘nationalist inspiration, leadership or goals.’[50] Furthermore, the idea that writings of literary nationalists, predominantly living outside the ‘burgeoning nation’, incited revolts does not stand up to scrutiny.[51] There was one Serbian leader who was literate during a 1807 meeting between the sultan and representatives of the Balkan people.[52] Therefore, it further begs the question how nationalist literature could have reached a population that had literary rates below 0.5%.[53] Conversely, it was in fact a failure to govern in a manner that ensured ‘basic justice’ was enacted that was the motivation behind a peasantry uprising.[54] Finally, it was the pressure to ‘strengthen the military’ that motivated both the Spanish and Ottoman Empires to extract more resources from their respective colonies.
In conclusion the points of similarity that have been identified are a regression of power for both empires at the start of the eighteenth century. Although for very different reasons, on one hand there were religious factions challenging the sultan, and on the other, internal factions that weakened central authority. The Spanish crown then experienced a reduction in its international standing and commercial trade. Post-War of Jenkins Ear they were able to once again take advantage of international commerce and gain further colonial possessions, thus allowing them to pursue a reinvigoration of their military that they so desperately wanted to ensure they were on the same standing as other European powers. Selim III, likewise, looked to pursue a period of reform in the government and military, although there was more resistance from his military. There were similarities in why they wanted this, namely, protection against foreign powers and to be able to put down internal disturbances. There are several similarities in the manner in which they managed this drive for further resources, mainly through exploitation of the peripheral regions of their empires. Moreover, the result of the exploitation was similar, the rejection by locals of the ruling metropole, although the Spanish were much more successful in putting down their rebellion than the Ottomans. This comparison further adds to the debate around the emergence of nationalism in empires. This essay suggests that it was in fact the policy of the metropole, not spontaneous emergence of nationalist sentiment that fuelled the rebellions in the Balkans and South America. Notes
[1] Christopher Alan Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914: Global Connections and Comparisons (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), p. 33. [2] Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, p. 33. [3] Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, p. 76. [4] Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, p. 76. [5] Allan Cunningham, “Review of Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III, 1789-1807 by Stanford J. Shaw.” The Journal of Modern History, 44/3 (1972), p. 416. [6] Brading, “Bourbon Spain and its American Empire,” p. 389. [7] Silvia Z. Mitchell, Mariana of Austria and Imperial Spain: Court, Dynastic, and International Politics in Seventeenth-Century Europe (Ph.S. dissertation, University of Miami, 2013), p. 100. [8] Mitchell, Mariana of Austria and Imperial Spain, p. 225. [9] David A. Brading, “Bourbon Spain and its American Empire,” in Leslie Bethell (ed.), The Cambridge History of Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 391. [10] Mark A. Burkholder, Lyman L. Johnson, Colonial Latin America (New York: Oxford Univeristy Press, 1988), p. 249. [11] Burkholder, Johnson, Colonial Latin America, pp. 253-254. [12] Burkholder, Johnson, Colonial Latin America, p. 248. [13] Burkholder, Johnson, Colonial Latin America, p. 248. [14] Brading, “Bourbon Spain and its American Empire,” p. 392. [15] Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World, p. 94. [16] Brading, “Bourbon Spain and its American Empire”, p. 397. [17] Brading, “Bourbon Spain and its American Empire”, p. 411. [18] Brading, “Bourbon Spain and its American Empire”, p. 412. [19] Burkholder, Johnson, Colonial Latin America, p. 256. [20] Cunningham, “Review of Between Old and New,” p. 414. [21] “Yassy Peace Treaty.” December 29, 1791. Euro Docs <http://doc.histrf.ru/18/yasskiy-mirnyy-dogovor/> [Accessed November 24, 2019]. [22] M. Sükrü Hanioglu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), p. 44. [23] Hanioglu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, p. 45. [24] Cunningham, “Review of Between Old and New”, p. 416. [25] Cunningham, “Review of Between Old and New”, p. 416. [26] Brading, “Bourbon Spain”, p. 395. [27] Brading, “Bourbon Spain and its American Empire”, p. 405. [28] Brading, “Bourbon Spain and its American Empire”, p. 414. [29] Brading, “Bourbon Spain and its American Empire”, p. 414. [30] Brading, “Bourbon Spain and its American Empire”, p. 415. [31] Brading, “Bourbon Spain and its American Empire”, p. 417. [32] Hanioglu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, p. 43. [33] Hanioglu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, p. 44. [34] Hanioglu, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, p. 44. [35] Brading, “Bourbon Spain and its American Empire,” p. 403. [36] John Huxtable Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America 1492-1830 (New Heaven, London: Yale University Press, 2006), p. 353; Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World, p. 354. [37] Brading, “Bourbon Spain and its American Empire,” p. 408. [38] Brading, “Bourbon Spain and its American Empire,” p. 409. [39] Ali Yaycioglu, Partners of the Empire: The Crisis of the Ottoman Order in the Age of Revolutions (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2016), p. 354. [40] Yaycioglu, Partners of the Empire, p. 204. [41] Frederick Anscomebe, “The Balkan Revolutionary Age,” The Journal of Modern History, 84/3 (2012), p. 572. [42] Anscomebe, “The Balkan Revolutionary Age,” p. 573. [43] Jeremy Adelman, “An Age of Imperial Revolutions,” The American Historical Review, 113/2 (2008), p. 336. [44] Yaycioglu, Partners of the Empire, p. 326. [45] Yaycioglu, Partners of the Empire, p. 357. [46] Yaycioglu, Partners of the Empire, p. 330. [47] David A. Brading, The First America: The Spanish Monarchy, Creole Patriots and the Liberal State 1492-1867 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 448. [48] Yaycioglu, Partners of the Empire, p. 328. [49] Anscomebe, “The Balkan Revolutionary Age,” p. 572. [50] Anscomebe, “The Balkan Revolutionary Age,” p. 600. [51] Anscomebe, “The Balkan Revolutionary Age,” p. 602. [52] Anscomebe, “The Balkan Revolutionary Age,” p. 600. [53] Anscomebe, “The Balkan Revolutionary Age,” p. 603. [54] Anscomebe, “The Balkan Revolutionary Age,” p. 602.
Bibliography
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