How significant were the military orders to the survival of the crusader states, 1120-1187?

By Quinn Marriott [Edited by Isabelle Grime and Carla Norman]

In the aftermath of the First Crusade, crusaders established control over several lands across the Levant: the kingdom of Jerusalem, the principality of Antioch and the counties of Edessa and Tripoli.[1] The Europeans essentially found themselves living in an alien environment.[2] This essay will argue that military orders helped by playing a crucial role in the survival of these crusader states. The military orders were groups who combined a religious with a military lifestyle, namely: the Templars, the Hospitallers, the Teutonic Knights and the Order of St Lazarus.[3] This essay will primarily be focusing on the Templars and Hospitallers because – as will be made apparent throughout the essay – they contributed the most to the Holy Land. The Teutonic Knights will be excluded here because their time of creation and activity go beyond the scope of this question. The Order of St Lazarus, however, will be mentioned, but only in addition to the Hospitallers since evidence for the order is much sparser than the other two.[4] This essay will show that the military orders became increasingly significant to the survival of the crusader states through three main factors: the orders military role, its service, and its political influence. It will also address the wider historiographical debate concerning the interactions between Frank and non-Frankish communities and whether Outremer was a closed and intolerant community as originally claimed by nineteenth century historians or perhaps, according to more recent scholarship, a melting pot of different cultures.[5]

Looking at the surface, it can be said that it was the retaliatory crusades of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries that ensured the continued survival of the crusader states. This essay, however, will be arguing that it was the military orders who played a more crucial role. Even after the capture of Jerusalem in 1099, the roads for pilgrims to the Holy Land had not become any safer and still needed protection.[6] The security of these pilgrims was important as they were one of the few regular Western visitors to the Levant and significantly contributed to the local economy.[7] This is where the military orders came in: the Hospitallers, created in 1113, gave medical care while the Templars, who were founded in 1120, provided military aid.[8] The Hospitallers had already been sanctioned by the papacy upon their foundation and in 1129 at the Council of Troye, the Templars also became officially acknowledged as an Order.[9] This allowed the Templars to rapidly expand and attract more attention and recruitment.[10] William of Tyre even claimed that by the time he was writing (c.1170-74) the order had “about 300 knights […] in addition to the brothers, who are almost countless”.[11] This sudden rise in power may have pushed other orders to follow suit by militarising, the Hospitallers doing so sometime between the 1120s and the 1160s.[12]

Alternatively, the eventual militarisation of the orders can be attributed to an apparent crisis in Outremer, a complete lack of manpower.[13] Once the First Crusade was over, most crusaders went home, leaving the minority in charge of the Frankish Levant. Fulcher of Chartres reported that at the start of Baldwin I’s reign, the king only had three-hundred knights and the same number of foot soldiers, too low to properly run Outremer.[14] We can see the military orders being used to make up for this lack in manpower by giving/selling to them strongholds and having them garrison them as well as fight in the field.[15] This was an opportunity for the orders to gain valuable experience in understanding their surroundings, both the local geography and their Muslim enemies, inevitably improving their effectiveness in battle.[16] This proved to be critical in situations like the Second Crusade, where King Louis VII turned over running the army to the Templars whose local knowledge led the French army relatively safely.[17] Over time, the orders were given more strongholds, the Hospitallers owning eleven or twelve by the 1160s and a presumably similar number held by the Templars (records have been lost so uncertain).[18] The chronicle of Ernoul and Bernard attests to this increased ownership by describing castles belonging to either of the two orders and claiming that they could not find any castles which belonged to neither.[19]

The Templars and Hospitallers were therefore successfully able to take the leading role in defending the crusader states. Aside from their control over numerous castles, the orders did not rely on locally obtained income and drew funds from the West as well as from tributes from neighbouring Muslim powers.[20] This put them in a strong defensive position which allowed them to face the rising Muslims dynasties of the twelfth century under Zangi, Nur al-Din and eventually, Saladin.[21] Even the Muslims recognised the power of the military orders, Ibn al-Athir describing them as the “firebrands of the Franks”.[22] These stern preparations against Muslim forces seemingly supports the idea of a more closed off, violent and intolerant Outremer. Such feelings, however, according to John France, have easily been exaggerated and the attitudes of the defenders were not actually far removed from the standard practices of western medieval warfare.[23]

While the military role of the orders was significant in the maintenance of the crusader states, their service to the citizens/nobility of Outremer was also important in helping stabilise the region. This form of aid stemmed from the order’s religious lifestyle. We can see this with the Rule of the Templars which was created when the Templars were officiated in 1129.[24] Bernard of Clairvaux was one of the Order’s influential friends and played a major role in writing the Rule and continued providing support to the Order.[25] The Rule portrayed the Templars as a virtuous order whose members “renounced their own wills” and revived the order of knighthood.[26] The Rule was a part of larger body of thought concerning the distinction between the secular solider and the solider of Christ, the latter being the stronger of the two.[27] Emphasis was placed on the responsibility of these warriors of God to not only act in a military capacity, but to help the weak and the poor as well as the Church.[28] In fact, the attempt at balancing between a military and religious way of life brought criticism.[29] There was doubt, however, not only outside but also within the Templar and Hospitaller communities with many opposing the mix of military and religious activities.[30] The extent of these dissenting voices must have varied but they continued unsilenced for the rest of the Middle Ages.[31]

The orders were, nevertheless, still able to maintain their duality. The Hospitallers for example, despite being militarised, gave almsgiving and built hospitals, treating all sick regardless of race or religion.[32] The same may be said for the Order of St Lazarus. Whilst the earliest record of them in battle is at the battle of La Forbie in 1244, it has often been assumed that they had been militarised since the middle of the twelfth century and yet still cared for lepers.[33] Equal treatment of non-Franks was potentially a service that was also carried out by the Franks as well as the military orders. Ibn Jubayr claimed that the Muslims in Tyre and Acre had religious freedom and were able to pray, although it is impossible to know if this was the same in the rest of the Levant.[34] We can at least say that the military orders were open to this idea or so we are told by Usamah ibn-Munqidh. Munqidh claimed that the Templars allowed him to pray freely inside the al-Aqsa Mosque and even threw out a Frank who interrupted his prayer.[35] It seems that generally speaking, Muslim populations lived in relative peace in Outremer.[36] These services further prove that crusading society did not segregate Franks and non-Franks and in fact, the ruling minority had a vested interest in appeasing the locals to prevent any form of unrest.[37]

The military orders had also acquired a vast wealth which they used to contribute to the development of the crusader states. This was initially achieved through donations alone from pious Christians.[38] A later but valid example is in the will of Henry II who gifted each of the military orders five-thousand silver marks, attesting to the popularity gained by the orders.[39] In search of other ways of making money, the orders implanted themselves across Western Europe and successfully set up various headquarters and estates from which they could gain surpluses of revenue, supplies and personnel and export them to the East.[40] With these resources, the orders got into moneylending and banking, the Templars being the most important contributor to this business.[41] As bankers, the Templars were able to grant loans for the special needs like a crusade as was the case with Louis VII or finance the government administrations of Outremer.[42] The orders also owned several properties across the Levant, allowing them to receive funds on more localised levels.[43] The Hospitallers for example, owned several estates in Jerusalem, including houses, shops and enclosed yards […] which ranged in price from one to twelve bezants.[44] This provided extra revenue to accompany the profits being made in the cosmopolitan trading centres of Acre and Tyre.[45]

To only talk about the lands owned by the military orders in a financial capacity would be an incomplete analysis and ignore the evolving administrative structures that were practiced by these organisations.[46] With their ascending political influence, the orders did not just supply manpower to castles but instead were either able of acquiring land for building new castles or renovating existing ones.[47] The Templars in 1152 for example, succeeded in negotiating for a part of a town near Tripoli to build a castle.[48] For the military orders, castles became administrative hubs as well as defensive positions from where they could manage the surrounding area.[49] The archaeological evidence tells us that these places were significant for the orders since they are the ones to receive the most investment and this becomes a recurring theme for regions where the orders had de facto control.[50] The archaeology also shows us the relationship the orders had with the adjacent towns and that while they were integrated with civic defences, at the same time they were visibly segregated with walls and moats.[51] These findings are an important addition to the historiography of crusader society and corroborate with Thomas Asbridge’s conclusion on the subject: that while Outremer was not an exploitative colony, neither was it a multicultural utopia and that the reality must lay somewhere between these two extremes.[52]

The administrations itself was complex. Once the crusader states had first been established, the Franks had to set up the frameworks upon which to rule to ensure continued occupation.[53] As a result, Feudalism was brought over to the East.[54] The basis of this system was of a relationship between the feudal lord and his vassals in which the former would grant land in exchange for services such as military aid and loyalty.[55] The general idea was to pragmatically integrate these western methods in Levantine governments rather than seeking out new systems.[56] That is not to say, however, that the administration on a whole was western. The survival of local customs after a foreign conquest is a commonly assumed historical phenomenon.[57] In this case, the inclusion of Muslim policies and administration in the Levant is something that has received a good deal of scholarship.[58] An example of this are the roles that were played by Muslim villages in local and regional governments, each represented by a ra’is.[59] By agreeing to garrison and manage strongholds and their surrounding territories, the military orders gained privileges that made their estates essentially independent.[60] They were, therefore, significant not only in setting up these hubs of administrations but also in helping integrate Western and Levantine political systems.

The political influence of the military orders was also useful as it allowed them to join the bigger political discussions going on within the crusader states. This involvement was an important step for the orders since they were experienced in the workings of Latin Syria and in dealing with the increasing Saracens threat which was critical to Outremer’s defence.[61] Furthermore, unlike the barons and the communes, the military orders were committed to the well-being and protection of the Holy Land.[62] In discussions regarding the relations with Muslims, the orders were there with representatives who would provide advice and in discussions of succession, the orders would also be present at the High Court.[63] An example of the orders gaining political power can be seen with the Hospitallers, for whom the years between 1160 and 1187 were very significant. In that time, not only do we see developments in their military activities but more importantly, the first signs of influence on Latin politics, convincing King Almaric I to invade Egypt in 1168.[64] Failing that particular campaign, the Hospital continued its involvement in Latin politics where it would gain a favourable position and when the Order was the most famous.[65] Despite serving in an advisory capacity and together earning political favour, the orders did not aim on ending or compromising internal disputes.[66] This was because the orders themselves were divided, particularly on the succession crisis of 1186, the Templars baronial and the Hospitallers royalist.[67] Even though the military orders originally got politically involved for the sake of the crusader states, this crisis sharply divided the East and arguably facilitated the eventual downfall of Outremer to Saladin.[68]

To conclude, the functions and actions of the military orders were significant for the survival of the crusader states. Their military role made up for the lack of manpower and contributed to the overall defence of the Levant, garrisoning castles that would help in the fight against any insurgents or neighbouring Muslim powers. The orders also helped on a local level, providing aid to the people of the Holy Land by offering services such as medical care as well as showing tolerance by allowing Muslim prayer. The economic gains made by the orders were also important for funding Outremer, its campaigns and political activities, stabilising the region. Finally, there was significance in the administration and political involvement the orders had in the Latin East because, as a result of their political influence, they were able to set up centres of government in castles, working with the local communities to manage their respective regions. Furthermore, the orders got directly involved in the politics of the Latin East which enabled them to work closely with governing officials which would facilitate their objective, to protect the crusader states.

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Notes

[1] Jonathan Riley-Smith, The Knights of St John in Jerusalem and Cyprus 1050-1310 (London: Macmillan St Martin’s Press, 1967), pp. 11-12. [2] Riley-Smith, Knights, pp. 11-12 [3] Alan Forey, The Military Orders: From the Twelfth to the Early Fourteenth Centuries (London: Macmillan Education, 1992), pp. 1-2; p. 17. [4] Forey, Orders, p. 19. [5] Michael Gervers and James Powell (eds.), Tolerance and Intolerance: Social Conflict in the Age of the Crusades (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2001), p. 65.; Thomas Asbridge, The Crusades: The War for the Holy Land (London: Simon and Schuster, 2010), p. 175. [6] Forey, Orders, p. 6. [7] Christopher Tyerman, God’s War: A New History of the Crusades (London: Penguin Books, 2007), pp. 168-9. [8] Andrew Jotischky, Crusading and the Crusader States (New York: Routledge, 2017), pp. 83-4. [9] Jotischky, Crusading, pp. 83-4. [10] Jotischky, Crusading, pp. 83-4. [11] William of Tyre, “Historia Rerum Partibus Transmarinis Gestarum 1170-84”, in James Brundage (trans.), The Crusades: A Documentary Survey (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1962), pp. 70-3. [12] Forey, Orders, p. 18. [13] Forey, Orders, p. 7. [14] Forey, Orders, p. 7. [15] Forey, Orders, p. 44. [16] Nikolas Jaspert (trans.), Phyllis Jestice, The Crusades (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 158-9. [17] Jonathan Phillips, Holy Warriors: A Modern History of the Crusades (New York: Random House, 2009), p. 94. [18] Forey, Orders, p. 59. [19] Louis de Mas Latrie (ed.), Chronique d’Ernoul et de Bernard le tresorier (Paris: J. Renouard, 1871), pp. 27-8. [20] Forey, Orders, p. 98-9. [21] Forey, Orders, p. 44. [22] Riley-Smith, Knights, p. 75. [23] Gervers and Powell, Tolerance, p. 3. [24] Judith Upton-Ward (trans.), The Rule of the Templars: The French Text of the Rule of the Order of the Knights Templar (Suffolk: Boydell Press, 1992), pp. 3-4. [25] Upton-Ward, Templars, pp. 3-4. [26] Upton-Ward, Templars, p. 19; p. 21. [27] Forey, Orders, pp. 10-11. [28] Forey, Orders, pp. 10-11. [29] Jaspert, Crusades, p. 147. [30] Jaspert, Crusades, p. 147. [31] Jaspert, Crusades, p. 147. [32] Aleks Pluskowski, “The Archaeology of the Military Orders”, Medieval Archaeology, 62/1 (2018), pp. 105-134; Tyerman, God’s War, p. 213. [33] Forey, Orders, p. 19. [34] Asbridge, Crusades, p. 182. [35] Usamah ibn-Munqidh, The Book of Contemplation Part II: Wonders of Warfare, Against Infidels and Muslims, 1183, p. 147. [36] Asbridge, Crusades, p. 181. [37] Asbridge, Crusades, p. 182. [38] Jaspert, Crusades, p. 161. [39] Leopold Delisle (ed.), Elie Berger, Recueil des actes de Henri II: Roi D’Angleterre et Duc de Normandie (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1909), pp. 219-21. [40] Pluskowski, Archaeology, pp. 105-134. [41] Forey, Orders, pp. 115-6. [42] Forey, Orders, pp. 115-6. [43] Susan Edgington and Helen Nicholson (eds.), Deeds Done Beyond the Sea: Essays on William of Tyre, Cyprus and the Military Orders Presented to Peter Edbury (Surrey: Ashgate, 2014), p. 189. [44] Edgington and Nicholson, Deeds, p. 193. [45] Jaspert, Crusades, p. 91. [46] Forey, Orders, p. 3. [47] Forey, Orders, p. 62. [48] Jonathan Riley-Smith, “The Templars and the Castle of Tortosa: an unknown document concerning the acquisition of the fortress”, The English Historical Review, 84/331 (1969), pp. 278-84. [49] Pluskowski, Archaeology, pp. 105-134. [50] Pluskowski, Archaeology, pp. 105-134. [51] Pluskowski, Archaeology, pp. 105-134. [52] Asbridge, Crusades, pp. 188-9. [53] Asbridge, Crusades, p. 178. [54] Jaspert, Crusades, p. 88. [55] Jaspert, Crusades, p. 88. [56] Asbridge, Crusades, p. 178. [57] Gervers and Powell, Tolerance, p. 65. [58] Gervers and Powell, Tolerance, p. 65. [59] Asbridge, Crusades, pp. 178-9. [60] Riley-Smith, Knights, p. 69. [61] Riley-Smith, Knights, p. 146. [62] Riley-Smith, Knights, p. 146. [63] Riley-Smith, Knights, p. 148. [64] Riley-Smith, Knights, pp. 60-1. [65] Riley-Smith, Knights, pp. 65-6. [66] Riley-Smith, Knights, p. 151. [67] Riley-Smith, Knights, p. 151. [68] Riley-Smith, Knights, p. 151.

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Bibliography:

Primary Sources

De Mas Latrie, Louis (ed.). Chronique d’Ernoul et de Bernard le tresorier. Paris: J. Renouard, 1871

Delisle, Leopold and Berger, Elie (ed.). Recueil des actes de Henri II: Roi D’Angleterre et Duc de Normandie, 1182. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1909

Ibn-Munqidh, Usama. The Book of Contemplation Part II: Wonders of Warfare, Against Infidels and Muslims. 1183

Riley-Smith, Jonathan. “The Templars and the Castle of Tortosa in Syria: an unknown document concerning the acquisition of the fortress”. The English Historical Review. Volume 84/331, 1969

Tyre, William. “Historia Rerum Partibus Transmarinis Gestarum” in Brundage, James (ed.). The Crusades: A Documentary Survey. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1962

Upton-Ward, Judith (trans.). The Rule of the Templars: The French Text of the Rule of the Order of the Knights Templar. Suffolk: Boydell Press, 1992

Secondary Sources

Asbridge, Thomas. The Crusades: The War for the Holy Land. Simon and Schuster: London, 2010

Edgington, Susan and Nicholson, Helen (eds.). Deeds Done Beyond the Sea: Essays on William of Tyre, Cyprus and the Military Orders presented to Peter Edbury. Surrey: Ashgate, 2014

Forey, Alan. The Military Orders: From the Twelfth to the Early Fourteenth Centuries. London: Macmillan Education, 1992

Gervers, Michael and Powell, James. Tolerance and Intolerance: Social Conflict in the Age of the Crusades. New York: Syracuse University Press, 2001

Jaspert, Nikolas (trans.). Jestice, Phyllis. The Crusades. New York: Routledge, 2006

Jotischky, Andrew. Crusading and the Crusader States. New York: Routledge, 2017

Phillips, Jonathan. Holy Warriors: A Modern History of the Crusades. New York: Random House, 2009

Pluskowski, Aleks. “The Archaeology of the Military Order”. Medieval Archaeology. 62/1. 2018

Riley-Smith, Jonathan. The Knights of St John in Jerusalem and Cyprus 1050-1310. London: Macmillan St Martin’s Press, 1967

Tyerman, Christopher. God’s War: A New History of the Crusades. London: Penguin Books, 2007