By May El Mantawy [Edited by Megan Saunders and Anisa Taznim]
In the post-colonial period, the debate over responsibility for the perceived lack of prosperity in African states has come to the fore. This debate takes two approaches – the external approach and the internal approach. The external approach suggests that it was a culmination of powerful external institutions which led to the hindrance of substantial prosperity in post-colonial African states, such as lingering impacts of Western colonialism and the slave trade, exploitation from multinational corporations and insufficient flows of foreign aid. The internal approach contrarily argues that African leaders themselves played a large role in the failings of African states, with systemic corruption, political tyranny and unnecessary civil wars. Whilst it is an easy assumption to make that the colonial and imperial influence left damaging effects on post-colonial African states and this is the reason why they continue to suffer, it is true that in many cases, it has been the misguided and corrupt leadership of African leaders that have prolonged this suffering and lack of prosperity. Misfortune from the colonial period was simply worsened by leaders who made more effort to better their own individual political and economic status rather than bettering the state they were leading, thus indicating that they are responsible for the continued lack of prosperity in post-colonial African states.
The internal approach takes root in a theory known as the gatekeeper state, as developed by Frederick Cooper. The concept of a gatekeeper state nods towards the internal governance of the post-colonial state as the key reason for stunted growth – most particularly the corrupt nature of leadership and its impact on the state economy. In a post-colonial African state, it is true that once you control the leadership, you subsequently control all its resources, thus the president of the state would control all resources and be able to benefit from them as they wish. In a gatekeeper state, the state administration has no effective checks or balances, and the apparatus of the state is put at the disposal of the ruler, who holds little to no accountability of transparency.[1] Key examples of these gatekeeper states most notably include Angola and Nigeria in this post-colonial period, with Frederick Cooper describing Angola in this period as “a caricature of conflict over gatekeeping”.[2] Angola is an interesting example because it is a country plagued by both the gatekeeper state and the ‘resource curse’. These two states of being are so incredibly entangled in a way that they both enable each other to continue to exist. With Angola being such a resource-rich state, it was expected that it would economically benefit to a substantial extent, particularly with oil being an immensely sought-after resource. In recent years there has been a growing United States (US) dependence on African oil imports, and Africa has quickly become a valued source of oil and gas supplies – a critical contribution to the global oil market considering the increased global demand and a shrinking market, supplying approximately nine per cent of the world’s oil reserves.[3] With such a high demand for oil and Angola being a country that contributes to Africa’s abundance of oil supplies, this seemed to be the perfect opportunity to strengthen the country’s economic position and take advantage of its resources to further the lives of Angolan citizens.
Despite these expectations, Angola failed to benefit from these circumstances, as shown by the lack of development in the social sector of the state. Across Africa, the inability for economic growth to come to fruition despite ample opportunity is often accredited to the ‘resource curse’ – the concept that a country rich with resources will struggle to achieve sustainable economic growth.[4] John L. Hammond argues against the existence of a ‘curse’ and suggests a much simpler explanation for the lack of sustained economic growth, asserting that it is the fault of “authoritarian governments that fail to invest for the future.”[5] Hammond further discusses how “rent-rich governments tend strongly to authoritarianism and inefficiency in development and welfare programs […] they do not invest adequately in education – thereby neither providing for social welfare needs nor producing human capital, creating a further impediment to development.”[6] Angola, as a country rich with resources, had not been managed correctly in a way to create fruitful results for the state and therefore to sustain economic growth; the abundance of resources has not been harnessed to produce human capital or to further the lives of Angolan citizens. This is where the alleged ‘resource curse’ begins to intertwine with Frederick Cooper’s gatekeeper theory - as aforementioned, the leader of a gatekeeper state can control the state and all its resources.
A corrupt leader prone to mismanagement and poor governance takes advantage of this access to an abundance of crucial resources as a means to further their own position in the state. Hammond summarises this in stating that “a government living on oil revenues does not need to develop a strong tax base or cultivate popular support through consistent programs.”[7] From this, it is understood that leaders of resource-rich countries, especially countries such as Angola, did not need to rely on popular content of the nation to remain in power or to ensure social welfare for its citizens, as long as they could “maintain power by co-opting or coercing different segments of the population.”[8] With the continuation of the ‘resource curse’ and a country that remains to be rich with resources, this further fuels the gatekeeper state and enables corrupt leaders to continue taking advantage of the economic state in order to further their own political positions. This, therefore, shows how the poor and corrupt leadership of African leaders in the post-colonial state led to a hindrance of progression and economic growth in countries such as Angola, in taking advantage of their positions as ‘gatekeepers’ of the state and incorrectly using their abundance of resources.
In the post-colonial period, it is understood that Africa was a continent rich with resources and had great potential for production. This often meant that African states suffered from extraversion – when African resources would be produced or harvested for people elsewhere in the world, as opposed to for the sustenance of African people. In states where extraversion occurred, it was the people who controlled the power in the state who enriched themselves with the capital made from exporting African products as they had political claims to legitimacy. These leaders abused African resources in order to further enrich themselves and to suppress and disenfranchise the population. Whilst this extraversion had at times resulted in the dependence of external sources, Jean-Francois Bayart identifies the fact that “Africans here have been active agents in the mise en dependence of their societies, sometimes opposing it and at other times joining in it” and “Africa’s contemporary political struggles and wars are not the consequences of a radical rupture – colonisation – but are symptomatic of a historical line of continuity, namely, a practice of extraversion.” [9]
Bayart’s conclusion is that whilst extraversion may have resulted in African economic dependence on external factors, it was Africans themselves who played an active role in the export of African produce as opposed to using it to enrich the nation. Bayart further strengthens the internal argument by stating that “the people who manage this unequal relationship with the international economic system are able to derive from it the resources necessary for their domestic overlordship.”[10] Not only did African leaders engage in these unequal trading relationships willingly, but they also did so with the intention of furthering their own domestic political gain, thus suggesting that the selfishness of African leaders was the cause of stunted growth of African nations as opposed to external oppression. This has been co-signed by R. H. Bates who discusses the use of financial corruption and political corruption by the leaders of African states to further their own careers: “the bureaucracy that is mandated to control the operation of a market […] finds itself in control of financial and political resources – resources that render the program economically useful to those in control of it and a means for generating a political following.”[11] Bates asserts that those who are in control of the state and its markets subsequently find themselves in control of financial and political benefits that they can choose to use to their own advantage at any given point. This, therefore, indicates the corrupt nature of African leaders and nods to Cooper’s theory of a gatekeeper state through the idea that control over the state equates to control of resources, thus suggesting that the alleged lack of prosperity was the fault of incompetent and self-enriching African leaders as opposed to oppressive external factors.
Despite these corrupt actions of African leaders leading to the hindrance of sustainable growth on the continent, the external approach takes the stance that the root of these problems lies at the feet of external oppressors who have victimised Africans. One of the largest explanations for the supposed lack of prosperity in post-colonial African states is given to Africa’s colonial and imperial experience. This stance suggests that the colonial experience and the ‘Scramble for Africa’ left the previously colonised states in such a vulnerable position that it was inevitable that these states would succumb to external pressure and fundamentally flawed systems of democracy and governance. In the decolonisation process of Africa, the most economically prosperous imperial powers were able to smoothly decolonise, such as Britain. Imperial powers such as Portugal suffered with the decolonisation process as it was the least economically successful power, meaning that it had to try to continue grasping onto its colonial states for as long as it could.[12] In How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, Walter Rodney discusses Europe’s exploitation of Africa and its resources: “Europe’s greatest source of primary capital accumulation was overseas, and the profits from African ventures continually outran the capital invested in the colonies.”[13] Rodney’s evaluation of Europe’s source of capital shows how European colonial powers routinely took produce and imports from Africa without investing the same capital back into the colonies. This served to continually strengthen the economic growth of European countries whilst African economies suffered, ultimately strengthening the colonial relationship even in post-colonial years as African states relied on the minimal input that European powers were filtering in. Not only this, but trade and manufacturing companies such as Unilever would take advantage of the produce in African states.
This was seen in the Belgian colonial state of Congo where cheap palm oil was made in Africa, whilst the profits went to the Lever Company outside of Africa.[14] In this process, Africans were paid low wages, African resources went outside of the continent and Europe continued to profit and get richer. Walter Rodney goes on to suggest a reason why in a post-colonial period European powers would continue to offer help to African states. He indicates that creating a capitalist economy and developing better agricultural techniques would be extremely beneficial to the greater development of Europe; “What was called ‘the development of Africa’ by the colonialists was a cynical shorthand for ‘the intensification of colonial exploitation in Africa to develop capitalist Europe.”[15] The continuous extraversion here may be used for the external approach of the debate – the exploitation of African resources by large European companies laid the foundations for a fundamentally flawed state; a state that relied on external aid and therefore, once on its own, continued to look towards external powers and neglected domestic policies. This, therefore, shows how the state of colonialism has left a lasting impact on African states, inhibiting its ability to gain economic confidence and growth.
The dependent relationship that post-colonial African states developed with external powers has continued into modern history, with African states such as Zambia relying on International Monetary Fund (IMF). With the outburst of copper mining and the Copperbelt in the 1920s, Zambia was launched into a sudden industrial development, pushing the nation into a new type of “modernisation.”[16] Despite the sudden rise to industrialisation, between 1980 and 1993, Zambia’s GNP per capita shrunk by 3.1% annually, leaving it at the bottom of the World Bank’s hierarchy of “developing nations.”[17] Zambia had no other choice but to turn to the IMF to help its economy and to get back on its feet, yet taking a loan from the IMF is not as simple as it may seem. Taking a loan from the IMF requires structural adjustment – essentially adjusting the way in which the state is run in a way that the IMF sees fit.[18] Often at times, this had resulted in these states, particularly Zambia, losing national sovereignty and changing the foundations of the state as it was once known. This made Zambia increasingly dependent on export and the IMF, thus becoming a post-colonial African state dependent on external sources.
Frederick Cooper’s gatekeeper state theory which was previously explored may also be applied to the external approach – “foreign investment and foreign aid became so important to development funding – and eventually to the mere existence of some governments – reinforced gatekeeping as a strategy of rule.”[19] Thus, “gatekeeping states were especially vulnerable to the machinations of outside powers.”[20] The relationship between the help of external powers and the gatekeeper state was cyclical – for a state to be receiving foreign aid, it would be more susceptible to gatekeeping and self-enriching leaders, yet for a state to receive foreign aid it must comply and adjust itself internally, meaning the gatekeeper must cater to external powers, thus showing how African dependence on external powers had developed and impacted the autonomy of African states. The complex relationship between African states and external powers indicates how deeply rooted the impact of colonisation is on these states, and the paternalistic nature of these relationships suggests that African states were accustomed to depending on some greater external power, resulting in the inability to confront internal and domestic policies without being prompted.
To conclude, internal and external factors share an incredibly complex relationship in the way that they impact the prosperity and growth of post-colonial African states. As aforementioned, the internal approach of this debate takes the stance that the corruption and selfishness of African leaders and their overall incompetence has hindered any development of the state, such as in Angola. Yet the external approach takes the stance that the nature of post-colonial states is due to their colonial relationships and the lasting impacts of colonialism, as well as reliance on foreign aid as seen in Zambia. It can be argued, however, that it was a cyclical relationship between both internal and external factors which continued to inhibit substantial development of post-colonial African states. In many cases, it was impossible for the internal factors to play out without help from external factors.
Extraversion, the resource curse and the gatekeeper state theory each rely on some type of involvement from external powers to hinder economic growth. Without the initial paternal, colonial relationship, African states would not be susceptible to relying on external powers and being exploited by them under the guise of working together to create a profit. The presence of these exploitative relationships gave way to corrupt and self-enriching leaders who further exploited their own citizens to gain as much political and financial prosperity as possible. This, therefore, indicates that whilst external factors worked to victimise Africans and their resources for economic capitalist gain, the internal factors such as mismanagement and poor governance assisted in helping th The continuous extraversion here may be used for the external approach of the debate – the exploitation of African resources by large European companies laid the foundations for a fundamentally flawed state; a state that relied on external aid and therefore, once on its own, continued to look towards external powers and neglected domestic policies. This, therefore, shows how the state of colonialism has left a lasting impact on African states, inhibiting its ability to gain economic confidence and growth.
Notes
[1] Inge Amundsen, “Drowning in Oil: Angola’s Institutions and the ‘Resource Curse’”, Comparative Politics, 46/2 (2014), p. 177. [2] Frederick Cooper, “Possibility and Constraint: African Independence in Historical Context”, The Journal of African History, 49/2 (2008), p. 188. [3] Cyril Obi, “Oil as the ‘Curse’ of Conflict in Africa: Peering Through the Smoke and Mirrors”, Review of African Political Economy, 37/126 (2010), pp. 483-495. [4] Obi, “Oil as the ‘curse’ of conflict in Africa: peering through the smoke and mirrors” [5] John L. Hammond, “The Resource Curse and Oil Revenues in Angola and Venezuela”, Science & Society, 75/3(2011), p. 348. [6] Hammond, “The Resource Curse”, p. 352. [7] Hammond, “The Resource Curse”, p. 352. [8] Hammond, “The Resource Curse”, p. 352. [9] Jean-Francois Bayart and Stephen Ellis, “Africa in the World: A History of Extraversion”, African Affairs, 99/395 (2000), p. 219; p. 237. [10] Bayart, Ellis, “Africa in the World: A History of Extraversion”, p. 231. [11] R. H. Bates, Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies (University of California Press, 1981) p. 98. [12] Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 1972) p. 176. [13] Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, p. 176. [14] Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, p. 176. [15] Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, p. 185. [16] James Ferguson, Expectations of Modernity: Myths and Meanings of Urban Life on the Zambian Copperbelt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999) p. 1. [17] Ferguson, Expectations of Modernity, p. 10. [18] Ferguson, Expectations of Modernity, p. 10. [19] Frederick Cooper, “Possibility and Constraint: African Independence in Historical Context”, The Journal of African History, 49/2 (2008), p. 186. [20] Cooper, “Possibility and Constraint”, p. 187
Bibliography
Adelman, K. “Report from Angola”. Foreign Affairs. 53/3, 1975
Amundsen, Inge. “Drowning in Oil: Angola’s Institutions and the ‘Resource Curse’”. Comparative Politics. 46/2, 2014
Bates, R. H. Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies. California: University of California Press, 1981
Bayart, Jean-Francois and Ellis, Stephen. “Africa in the World: A History of Extraversion” African Affairs. 99/395, 2000
Cooper, Frederick. “Possibility and Constraint: African Independence in Historical Context” The Journal of African History. 49/2, 2008
Ferguson, James. Expectations of Modernity: Myths and Meanings of Urban Life on the Zambian Copperbelt. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999
Hammond, John L. “The Resource Curse and Oil Revenues in Angola and Venezuela”. Science & Society. 75/ 3, 2011
Obi, Cyril. “Oil as the ‘Curse’ of Conflict in Africa: Peering Through the Smoke and Mirrors”. Review of African Political Economy. 37/126, 2010
Rodney, Walter. How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. Nairobi: East African Educational Publishers, 1972
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