By Daniel McDowall [Edited by Alice Routledge and Eleanor Day]
The Spanish, Dutch, Portuguese, and British empires were four of the historically most significant empires in global history. This essay sets out to examine why the British and Dutch were more successful than the Spanish and Portuguese in establishing their empires overseas. Historians place great significance on the importance of naval power, with some even arguing that these empires were ‘dependent’ on it, such as Linda Colley.[i] Nevertheless, there are several other crucial factors in explaining why the British and Dutch were more successful than the Spanish and Portuguese. This essay begins with the strength of Britain’s navy, and how it was so crucial in helping establish their empire overseas, before turning to the different approaches the empires had, largely in how they dealt with local populations. This essay will then examine the importance of trade and economics, as well as the diplomatic and political problems which created issues for the Spanish and Portuguese. The general themes that can be taken from these topics seem to be a case of what the British and Dutch did well, and where the Spanish and Portuguese made mistakes, though they also lacked in many of the areas the British and Dutch did so well.
Naval strength was a pivotal aspect as to why the British, in particular, were more successful in their colonial exploits. Stephen Conway explains that the ‘Royal Navy was a key instrument of imperial defence and expansion’.[ii] This would suggest that an empire with a strong navy had a considerable upper hand in colonial expansion. Conway continues and explains that as a result of Britain’s naval power, it allowed them to be ‘projected across the oceans in ways that alarmed and discomforted its adversaries’.[iii] This indicates the strength of Britain’s navy, and how far-reaching it was. The fact that it seemed to scare Britain’s rivals shows just how beneficial this tool was to Britain’s success. Britain ‘used the threat of naval power to oblige the Spanish and French to back down on a number of extra-European disputes’.[iv] This indicates that Britain was far superior in comparison to Spain in terms of naval power, and gives a specific example on an area that the British were able to better the Spanish. The multi-purpose nature of the navy – in that it could be used diplomatically as well as for direct conflict – was also a huge benefit. This tells us that the British had considerable strength over their rivals in navy power. It relates specifically to Britain establishing overseas better than the Spanish and Portuguese as there was less threat, or competition from these empires, and was a useful weapon to help secure these territories. As many historians use such hyperbolic language about the importance of the navy, it is clear how important naval power was to the success of an empire.
Access to certain oceans was also important in establishing empires. Fernandez-Armesto indicates ‘access to the Atlantic was the only essential prerequisite of empires’ and thus demonstrates how important these oceans could be.[v] Colley places similar importance on the Mediterranean Ocean, describing it as ‘vital’ in ‘strategic imperial, and commercial terms’.[vi] Access to oceans had a plurality of uses, which helped them be so important to these colonial powers. ‘Before 1750, more British troops were stationed in Gibraltar and Minorca than the whole of North America’ which demonstrates just how valuable access to the Mediterranean Ocean was for the British.[vii] This reinforces the idea that naval strength was pivotal. All four of the empires we are examining had access to the Atlantic, and for periods, both Britain and Spain had influence and access to the Mediterranean. It is, therefore, reasonable to suggest that being in a geographically convenient place to control an ocean was pointless unless you had the resources to defend it.
These four empires had different approaches to their empires in terms of their methods, and how they interacted with local populations. John Plumb infers that the Dutch were without ‘panache, ostentation, and flamboyance’.[viii] This would make for an organised, effective empire, which was direct. The Spanish and Portuguese, on the other hand, have been depicted as having a ‘sheer level of cruelty involved in the imperial enterprise’ by Sankar Muthu.[ix] It is suggested here that the Spanish and Portuguese had the wrong balance of ruthlessness to keep control and simply being cruel. Regardless of the approach, there was always going to be opposition from locals to European empires, and Spain and Portugal’s approach would make these reactions worse. Spanish accounts of local people tell us about problems the Spanish encountered with them. Agustin de Zarate describes that ‘it is almost incredible […] that a barbarous and unlettered people have been ruled in so orderly a way’ in reference to the Incas.[x] This shock implies that the Spanish had encountered significant difficulties from local people in the past. It may also portray a fault in Spain’s approach to local populations, which John Elliott explains. He writes that the Spanish ‘over-estimated and then under-estimated’ these locals.[xi] It is clear from this depiction of the Spanish that their approach was flawed. In contrast, the British and Dutch realised that a ‘plurality of faiths and creeds’ with ‘political consent and religious tolerance’ made for a ‘successful formula for unlocking the door to economic growth’.[xii] The British and Dutch’s more liberal approach – even if it was sometimes grudgingly done – created more success than the Spanish’s harsh control of local populations, and therefore created more economic benefits than for the Spanish and Portuguese. It is suggested that the British and Dutch’s more liberal approach to empire and indigenous populations – in comparison to the Spanish and Portuguese’s – created much more prosperity and effectiveness for the empire, making it more successful. Less resistance from the locals allowed for an easier establishment of these empires.
Trade and economics within a colonial context were important for the health of an empire. Finance was required to keep these projects going and was something that the Dutch specialised very well in. Plumb highlights that trans-ocean trade was ‘rich and valuable’ for the Dutch.[xiii] This emphasises how financially important trade was to the operation of an empire. Luzac comments on how the Dutch would ‘fetch raw materials from foreign lands and re-export the finished products’ to places like ‘Spain, Portugal, Germany […].’[xiv] It is apparent that plenty of trade was being done, with lots of manufacturing too which boosted the economy and created finance which helped establish their overseas empire. The fact that they were trading with other colonial powers like Spain, Portugal, and Germany created benefits for the Dutch, as they were less likely to be troubled by their rivals which did not threaten any important trade deals. Charles Boxer indicates that this may have especially been the case for the Spanish and Portuguese as they ‘could not do without the raw and finished materials, particularly grain and naval stores, which the Dutch carriers brought’.[xv] This brought benefits for the Dutch, as it created less competition whilst trying to establish an empire overseas. Similarly, the opposite was true for the Spanish and Portuguese, as they had limitations whilst trying to establish overseas, as they may not have wanted to aggravate the Dutch.
Britain similarly found success in trade, but particularly in defending their economy. Their Navigation Acts ‘kept British colonial trade in British ships built and crewed in British territory and operating through British ports’.[xvi] They were, therefore ‘tied to a guaranteed British market’.[xvii] This defence of the British side of trade and shipping and tying it to a British market helped to secure the safety and prosperity of the British economy. Spain was less successful financially. Elliott indicates that they were ‘unable to make effective use of the rewards of empire’.[xviii] It is observable that the British and Dutch were superior to Spain in dealing with economics, and the Spanish and Portuguese’s reliance on Dutch trade created limitations for them when expanding and establishing colonially.
Diplomatic relations and political events also affected how well these empires established themselves. Plumb indicates that the Dutch army was ‘never large enough to withstand its enemies without allies’.[xix] It was a necessity to create allies and have good diplomatic relations, certainly in the Dutch’s case, or face being flattened by other colonial powers. Where the Dutch appear to have succeeded, the Spanish and Portuguese faced issues. In 1640, Portugal broke from Spain.[xx] This may not have necessarily caused direct conflict between the two nations, but it did create tension. As a result of this, resources had to be diverted as there were potential hostilities close to home. This was a huge distraction away from empire for Spain and Portugal, making empire a secondary issue if there was a threat directly on each other’s borders. This was also an issue that Britain could never have, as it is an island, and has oceans, as well as a strong navy to defend it. Elliott portrays this break from Portugal as particularly damaging for Spain. He describes how ‘the revolts of the 1640s in Catalonia, Portugal, Sicily, and Naples had shaken the Spanish Monarchy to its core’.[xxi] The Spanish saw the break with Portugal as a huge issue, which reinforces the idea that it was a huge distraction from empire, and resources were diverted away from colonial expansion, which made establishing their empires much harder. Diplomacy and politics were successful for the Dutch but created issues for the Spanish and Portuguese, which were made far worse by the geographical closeness of the two nations.
There were also limitations that the Portuguese encountered that does not fit into any of the other themes in this essay. For example, Portugal had resource limitations, hindering them from taking huge amounts of land. Elliott writes that ‘manpower was limited, local societies were resilient, and climate and disease tended to take a heavy toll of newly arrived Europeans’.[xxii] It is suggested here that the Portuguese did not have the resources to effectively establish overseas empires in the way they wanted to. They could be considered unlucky because of disease, but it would appear that the British and Dutch were able to overcome this, otherwise, they would have been hindered too. Being unable to deal with local resilience and still treating them cruelly was a misjudgment made by those making decisions on behalf of the Portuguese Empire.
The British and the Dutch were more successful than the Spanish and Portuguese as they excelled in areas such as naval power, trade, and economics, and were much better at it than the Spanish and Portuguese. There is also the suggestion that the Portuguese did not have the resources to do what they were trying to do. Their own, and Spanish, cruelty to their colonial territories and people created more resistance and made it harder to establish their empire overseas. Since Spain and Portugal faced tension with each other, it created a unique distraction that the British would not have to deal with at the same significance, nor the Dutch because of the importance of their trade with other colonial powers. British and Dutch successes, as well as Spanish and Portuguese failures and limitations, were principally why the Spanish and Portuguese could not establish their empires overseas as well as the British and Dutch did.
Notes: [i] Linda Colley, Captives: Britain, Empire, and the World 1600-1850 (London: Pimlico, 2003), p. 66. [ii] Stephen Conway, “Empire and British Identity: The Maritime Dimension”, in David Cannadine (ed.), Empire, the Sea, and Global History: Britain’s Maritime World, c.1763-c.1840 (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), p. 23. [iii] Conway, “Empire and British Identity”, p. 23. [iv] Conway, “Empire and British Identity”, p. 25. [v] Felipe Fernandez-Armesto, “Empire, Europe and British Naval Power”, in David Cannadine (ed.), Empire, the Sea, and Global History: Britain’s Maritime World, c.1763-c.1840 (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), p. 19. [vi] Colley, Captives, p. 70. [vii] Colley, Captives, p. 70. [viii] John Plumb, “Introduction”, in Charles Boxer (ed.), The Dutch Seaborne Empire 1600-1800 (London: Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., 1965), p. xxii. [ix] Sankar Muthu, Enlightenment Against Empire (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003) p. 117. [x] Agustin de Zarate and John Cohen (trans.), (eds.), The Discovery and Conquest of Peru (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968), p. 54. [xi] John Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World: British and Spain in America 1492-1830 (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006), p. 406. [xii] Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World, p. 407. [xiii] Plumb, “Introduction”, p. xxv. [xiv] Elie Luzac (ed.), Hollands Rijkdom (Leiden: Luzac, 1780), pp. 5-6. [xv] Charles Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne Empire 1600-1800 (London: Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., 1965), p. 22. [xvi] Geoffrey Bolton, Britain’s Legacy Overseas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 11. [xvii]Bolton, Britain’s Legacy, p.11. [xviii] Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World, p. 408. [xix] Plumb, “Introduction”, p. xxi. [xx] Boxer, The Dutch Seaborne Empire, p. 87. [xxi] Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World, p. 220. [xxii]Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World, p. 18.
Bibiography:
Primary sources:
Luzac, Elie (ed.). Hollands Rijkdom. Leiden: Luzac, 1780
Secondary Sources:
Bolton, Geoffrey. Britain’s Legacy Overseas. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1973
Boxer, Charles. The Dutch Seaborne Empire 1600-1800. London: Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., 1965
Colley, Linda. Captives: Britain, Empire, and the World 1600-1850. London: Pimlico, 2003
Conway, Stephen. “Empire and British Identity: The Maritime Dimension”. In David Cannadine (ed.) Empire, the Sea, and Global History: Britain’s Maritime World, c.1763-c.1840. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007
Elliott, John. Empires of the Atlantic World: British and Spain in America 1492-1830. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006
Fernandez-Armesto, Felipe. “Empire, Europe and British Naval Power”. In David Cannadine (ed.) Empire, the Sea, and Global History: Britain’s Maritime World, c.1763-c.1840. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007
Muthu, Sankar. Enlightenment Against Empire. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2003.
Plumb, John. “Introduction”, in Charles Boxer (ed.), The Dutch Seaborne Empire 1600-1800. London: Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., 1965
Zarate, Agustin de and Cohen, John. (trans.), (eds.) The Discovery and Conquest of Peru. Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1968
Comments