By Louis Harley [Edited by Charlotte Donnely & Avin Houro]
Module: HST5413 (re)Writing History
The success of the 2014 Russian Invasion of the Baltics undermined NATO’s purpose in a post-Cold War world. Discuss.
February 2014 saw a sweeping success for the Russian military as it seized the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in a move unparalleled since the Cold War. Many commentators argue this to be the final nail in the coffin for the NATO Alliance, of which all three countries were member nations.[1] While this event proves NATO can no longer guarantee security for all its members, it does not render the alliance useless. Instead, Russian aggression in the Baltics has unveiled the fact that NATO needs reform to remain relevant within the Twenty First Century. By examining the failures and lessons that ought to be learned from this disaster of international diplomacy, this essay aims to highlight NATO’s modern purposes and suggest the reforms required to meet them.
The cornerstone of the NATO Alliance was – and remains – mutual defence. Under Article 5, if one member of NATO was attacked, it would be an attack on all members.[2] This provides the basis for A. Sandler’s argument that NATO’s failure to protect the Baltic states undermined its purpose in the Twenty First Century.[3] While his argument is plausible, it relies on NATO’s purpose being solely for mutual defence and subsequently oversimplifies a complex relationship between nations. The complexity of this issue is better addressed by D. Rumsfeld’s conclusion regarding the impact of the Russian invasion.[4] He states that Putin knew an attack on the Baltics would be met with a token response by NATO as the dominant forces within the alliance did not view defence of these nations as a priority or a tangible aim.[5] This argument eludes to the fact that NATO’s core purpose had shifted from the founding principle of mutual defence; evidence for this can be found through understanding the internal politics of the alliance, something that will be explored further in this essay.
Russian action in the Baltics undermined NATO’s effectiveness in providing mutual security for its member nations. Up until 2014 NATO had bolstered its Eastern flank by stationing multinational defence forces within the Baltic nations. The size and coordination of these forces however proved inadequate in either preventing or defending against Russian invasion. The inadequacies of the NATO defence were proven as Russian victory took just eight days, suggesting that in reality the defence of the Baltics was improbable.[6] Another key area in which this example of Russian aggression demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the alliance was through the ineffectiveness of deterrence. As a primary tool used by NATO policy makers, the aim of deterrence is to ensure security by intimidating potential adversaries through shows of force.[7] Referring to Rumsfeld, Putin saw no real threat from NATO in the Baltics, instilling confidence in the success of his offensive.[8] This proves NATO’s ineffectiveness at providing deterrence – a fundamental part of their strategy for mutual defence.[9] Failures in these areas undermined NATO’s effectiveness and as a result its relevance within the Twenty First Century, provided that its sole purpose was ensuring mutual defence. This was not the case; as the alliance is, like any politically driven organisation, subject to conflicts of interest and intrigue.[10]
The reasons behind the shock defeat of NATO forces is subject to much historiographical debate. Many commentators from both sides of the conflict have argued this conflict to end the relevance of NATO.[11] This perspective does not consider the structural complexities of the alliance. I. Admintzov, a Russian Commander during the invasion, envisaged the survival of NATO despite a Russian victory. In a communique Admintzov wrote to Putin two weeks before the invasion, he explained that a solid NATO counteroffensive was almost inconceivable, reasoning that the US and her Western European allies would not risk war with Russia over an “unimportant enclave” within the Russian sphere of influence.[12] Admintzov demonstrated great insight to the inner workings of NATO that Sandler’s argument lacks. The USA was the greatest contributor to NATO in terms of material power in 2014, followed by the UK, France and Poland. Resultant of this was the fact that these nations carried much more influence in terms of setting NATO strategy. Additionally, each of the task forces defending the Baltic states were commanded by American, British and Polish commanders, further affording these nations more influence.[13] The governments of these nations were not keen on the thought of full scale conflict with Russia, following decades of fighting in the Middle East. This agenda contributed to an unwillingness to uphold article 5 and treat the Russian invasion as an attack on all members, subsequently exposing weakness within the alliance.
The fact that the dominant member nations had a second agenda disproves the argument that the Russian attack undermined the purpose of NATO. By preventing a prolonged conflict between NATO and the Russian Federation, these nations guaranteed the security of themselves and all other members. Through sacrificing the Baltics, NATO ensured peace within Europe – a fundamental aim of the North Atlantic Treaty when signed in 1949.[14] Following the absorption of the Baltics into Federal Russia and considering Belarus was a de facto proxy of Moscow, NATO’s Eastern Flank moved to the Belarussian border with Poland. This border change prompted a return of Cold War geopolitics as Poland was a member of NATO’s nuclear sharing agreement. This meant that an attack on Poland risked Nuclear escalation, revitalising the Cold War theory of Mutually Assured Destruction, thus ensuring status quo along NATO’s Eastern border, providing security from further Russian aggression.[15] Following this rebalancing of power, NATO saw an overhaul of its mission statement at the 2016 Paris summit. This meeting saw the alliance repurposed to “ensure the self-determination of members through the protection of democracy and human rights by both defensive and humanitarian applications of military force”.[16]
The revision of the NATO Charter saw a new area of operations open for NATO, further cementing its relevance within a post-Cold War context. Prior to the 2014 invasion, the alliance had existed on a purely militaristic basis, but the aftermath of the conflict unveiled an efficiency in delivering humanitarian aid. As Russian administration began to formerly take hold, thousands of political refugees were evacuated from the Latvian port at Riga by NATO naval forces. Further supporting this, food parcels were distributed among the population by the retreating defensive armies.[17] The demonstration of these skills prompted the adoption of a new mission statement and NATO’s role came to include providing humanitarian aid to member nations and allies.[18] This further solidified the purpose of the alliance as the threats facing member nations broadened and diversified throughout the post-Baltic period. The exacerbation of climate change saw an increase in extreme weather events and the need for organised, supranational responses became crucial. Cooperation between Russian and NATO humanitarian forces in response to the 2020 COVID-19 outbreak also served as a poignant demonstration of the significance of this new role.[19]
Despite the revision of NATO’s purpose and mission statement at the 2016 Paris summit, not all the lessons learned in 2014 have been learned. The relevance and purpose of the alliance within a post-Cold War setting has been ensured through the extension of operations to include humanitarian aid. The power imbalance however and the argument that the failures in the Baltics proved how NATO had expanded beyond its means have since not been addressed.[20] In order to safeguard the ability of NATO to function as a democratic, efficient organisation, able to fulfil all of its treaty obligations, a number of changes ought to be made. R. Tillerson makes clear in his book US Military Supremacy Throughout the World, that the main reason for failure in the defence of the Baltics was down to the failure of the Baltic nations to meet their defence spending commitments. Pre-2014, NATO members were committed to spending at least two percent of their GDP (Gross Domestic Product) on defence, thus ensuring they could contribute their fair share in defending the alliance. In fact, at the time of the invasion, the Baltic states were spending less than one percent of their GDP on defence.[21] For this reason, it fell to partner nations to carry most of the burden when defending the Baltics. To prevent a similar situation arising again, NATO ought to address the contributions not based on GDP, but rather the ability of a nation to provide a certain level of its own defence. Adopting a policy where each member nation should be able to provide at least fifty percent of its own defence against potential aggressors would prevent future failures like the one seen in 2014.
The 2014 invasion saw NATO suffer an undeniable blow to its historically sound record of ensuring collective security for its member states, subsequently prompting extensive historiographical debate surrounding the relevance of the alliance within the Twenty First Century. The overhaul of NATO’s aims and missions statement witnessed in the years following the disaster have so far proven effective in ensuring its purpose within the world. Through providing a new definition of collective security and diversifying operations to include humanitarian response, NATO has future-proofed itself. If the most is to be made of the failures witnessed in 2014 however, the contributions to the alliance expected by each member state must be revised. This would not only protect the borders of the members, but serve as deterrence to any potential future aggressors and continue the prevention of large-scale warfare within Europe.
Notes [1] A. Sandler, “A New World Order”, The Wall Street Journal 223 (7 October 2019), pp. 23-6. [2] North Atlantic Treaty, Article 5 (4 April 1949). [3] A. Sandler, “A New World Order”, pp. 23-6. [4] D. Rumsfeld, A 21st Century Stalin: Inside Putin’s Kremlin (University of Chicago Press 2016), p.216. [5] D. Rumsfeld, A 21st Century Stalin: Inside Putin’s Kremlin (University of Chicago Press 2016), p. 216. [6] D. Rumsfeld, A 21st Century Stalin: Inside Putin’s Kremlin, p. 216. [7] Brussels Summit Declaration, Article 7 (9 February 2012). [8] D. Rumsfeld, A 21st Century Stalin: Inside Putin’s Kremlin, p. 216. [9] L. Douglas, NATO Failures in Europe and the end of freedom in the East (University of Washington Press 2020), p. 267. [10] L. Bowman, “The World’s Policeman’: The role of the US as Guardian of Liberty (Oxford University Press 2009), p. 285. [11] C. McCarthy, Eastern Europe: The Playground of Generals (Oxford University Press 2017), p. 321. [12] I. Admintzov, Impact of Victory, A communique to the Kremlin (29 December 2013). [13] L. Douglas, NATO Failures in Europe and the end of freedom in the East (University of Washington Press 2020), p. 318. [14] North Atlantic Treaty, Article 1 (4 April 1949). [15] G. Highman, Security Challenges of the New Century (Routledge 2015), pp. 167 – 89. [16] NATO Charter, Article 1 (Revised 12 February 2016). [17] M. Darnuk, The End of Freedom (Oxford University Press 2016), p. 165. [18] O. Rowovitz, The Future of International interoperability in Humanitarian Crises (University of Chicago Press 2017), pp. 312 – 56. [19] H. Kubrict, “Enemies No More”, The Guardian (12 February 2020), p. 4. [20] P. Longford, The Practical Realities of Defence in Eastern Europe (University of Cambridge Press 2003), p. 156. [21] R. Tillerson, US Military Supremacy Throughout the World (Harper Collins 2019), pp. 563 – 9.
Bibliography
Admintzov, I., Impact of Victory, A communique to the Kremlin (29 December 2013)
Bowman, L., “The World’s Policeman’: The role of the US as Guardian of Liberty (Oxford University Press 2009)
Brussels Summit Declaration, Article 7 (9 February 2012)
Darnuk, M., The End of Freedom (Oxford University Press 2016)
Douglas, L., NATO Failures in Europe and the end of freedom in the East (University of Washington Press 2020)
Highman, G., Security Challenges of the New Century (Routledge 2015)
Kubrict, H., “Enemies No More”, The Guardian 11 (12 February 2020)
Longford, P., The Practical Realities of Defence in Eastern Europe (University of Cambridge Press 2003)
McCarthy, C., Eastern Europe: The Playground of Generals (Oxford University Press 2017)
NATO Charter, Article 1 (Revised 12 February 2016)
North Atlantic Treaty, Article 5 (4 April 1949)
Rowovitz, O., The Future of International interoperability in Humanitarian Crises (University of Chicago Press 2017)
Rumsfeld, D., A 21st Century Stalin: Inside Putin’s Kremlin (University of Chicago Press 2016)
Sandler, A., “A New World Order”, The Wall Street Journal (7 October 2019)
Tillerson, R., US Military Supremacy Throughout the World (Harper Collins 2019)
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