By Fatmanour Chouseinoglou [Edited by Klevis Kokoshi & Zhara Adal]
Module: HST5413 (re)Writing History
The division of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1922 left the Ottoman Empire as the only surviving imperial power until its collapse following the Second World War. The main reason behind the empire’s survival has long been debated by many historians, including Harrison, who argues that the empire’s survival was owed to its victory in the First World War.[i] Harrison, however, fails to realise that the outcome of the war mostly explains the physical demise of the Entente Empires rather than the survival of the Ottoman Empire, hence this essay will focus on the empire’s economic and political power and its approach to nationalism, rather than the role of the Great War itself. It was thanks to their economic stability that they were able to maintain a political stronghold and overcome nationalist insurgencies that were fatal in the cases of its imperial neighbours.
Firstly, the long-term economic success of the Ottoman Empire was the most significant factor contributing to its survival, as it enabled the empire to overcome short-term crises, such as the First World War and minor coup attempts. This allowed the government to maintain political legitimacy among its subjects. The main reason behind the empire’s economic success was its ability to adapt its policies to take advantage of key European events. For instance, with the commencement of World War One, the capitulation agreements between the Ottoman Empire and Entente Empires ceased to exist. Though this was an outcome of deteriorating relations, the Germans’ need for Ottoman cooperation meant that the Ottoman authorities could demand the dismissal of capitulation agreements with Germany as well. This demand can be found in Article 28 in the Treaty of Lausanne.[ii] The abolition of capitulations was crucial in aiding the development of the economy as it meant that they were no longer restricted from taxing European traders that used Ottoman territory to reach their destinations. The empire therefore found the opportunity to make up for the revenue lost through the European interruption of Ottoman trade routes and partnerships. The graph presented in Jefferson’s book shows a positive correlation between the years following the abandoning of capitulations and the increase of taxation of foreign traders, and thus the positive impact the abandoning of capitulations had on generating revenue through taxation.[iii] In addition, receiving the reparations, stated throughout the Treaty of Versailles, from the defeated powers allowed the Ottomans to further fund the industrialisation process that they had commenced before the nineteenth century.[iv] This was important considering the empire had started industrialising much later than its European counterparts, as it allowed them to quickly catch up and close the gap. Consequently, with an industrialised empire and income through taxation of foreign traders and reparations, the Ottomans were able to fund and invest in other areas of the empire without putting extra pressure on its citizens through increased taxation. This was important as it allowed for the development of the economy and ensured that the government retained a competent image among its people. Mathews’ argues that the main reason behind the demise of the German Empire despite their victory in the First World War was due to its inability to reinvest and maintain a strong economy.[v] Hence, if we are to compare this to the Ottoman Empire, as they were also one of the victorious powers, one can understand just how significant of a role the economy plays in the survival of an empire.
A second factor behind the Ottoman survival of the collapse of other global empires was the Committee of Union and Progress’s (CUP) strong political influence. In January 1913, Enver Pasha, Talaat Pasha and Djemal Pasha, three prominent individuals in the CUP, led a coup d’état against the government of the Freedom and Accord Party, effectively establishing a dictatorship of the triumvirate. This took place following the restoration of the Second Constitutional Era in 1908, which established a constitutional monarchy and made the sultan effectively powerless.[vi] This meant that the triumvirate had full control over the government and order, while the sultan at the time, Mehmed V ruled as a puppet of the new government. The victory earned by the end of the First World War, increased the CUP’s popularity and encouraged further support for the party until its deterioration during the Second World War. The popularity of the CUP can be seen in an image published in the Ottoman newspaper from 1928, called Ashab-i Devlet, or Statesmen.[vii] The image portrays a group of spectators in Istanbul, cheering as the triumvirate parade through the crowd on horseback to celebrate the tenth year of their victory since the war. One must be aware, however, that the newspaper was a pro-CUP newspaper and hence is written to portray the three Pashas in the best way possible, so it must be analysed with this in mind. Nevertheless, it does present an authentic photograph of a large crowd, so it is undeniable that the new government had a lot of supporters ten years on from the Great War. Though this may not be the case starting from the mid-1930s when the CUP began to tighten control over all areas of the empire. The political stability of the new government meant that they were able to carry out reform policies that were planned before the outbreak of the Great War, the first and most important being to modernise the empire, facilitating the process of industrialisation and urbanisation.[viii] These were essential steps in ensuring the Ottoman Empire was able to return to its previous level of strength and power. Total control over the army also meant that authorities could prevent the development of any coup attempts or nationalist insurgencies.[ix] The CUP’s political strength therefore was a significant factor behind the survival of the empire as it gave way to reform as well as facilitating the process of dealing with the problem of nationalism. The Freedom and Accord Party, however, was mostly able to ensure stability after the empire’s success in the war, which was made possible mostly due to the empire’s economic strength and ability to finance the war, therefore the significance of political stability is only secondary to the economic success.
The final factor that ensured the survival of the Ottoman Empire after the Great War, was without a doubt, the authorities’ ability to suppress and prevent further nationalist insurgencies, as one can see through the case of Austria-Hungary that the inability to do so can prove to be fatal. Nationalism was not new in the Ottoman Empire, as evident through the Greek War of Independence in 1832. Previously, the Ottomans had tried to prevent serious attempts of nationalist movements by using the Millet system to give each confessional group a certain degree of independence and authority. According to this system, each community could lead legal disputes under its own laws.[x] The introduction of the Tanzimat reforms at the end of the 19th century, however, promoted a sense of ‘Ottomanism’ in an attempt to institute centralised control over the individual groups by encouraging a sense of belonging to an Ottoman identity.[xi] Thus, the Tanzimat reforms effectively brought an end to the Millet system. This was not a popular step and was not a move welcomed by some groups, as evident through the series of unrests in the Balkans during the early years of the twentieth century. Mehmed Efendi, a popular statesman from Serbia, wrote a letter to the Ottoman central government asking them to reconsider the abolition of the Millet system in the name of the non-Muslim and non-Turks living within the border of the Ottoman Empire. He expressed his deep concerns about the events the decision may have led to and one can see later during the Balkan Wars that he was not wrong.[xii] It is undeniable that Ottoman policies introduced to combat the rise of nationalism were not completely successful, as it did not prevent the development of small nationalist movements. What is important to note here is that these small movements were prevented from becoming more serious due to the empire’s economic and political success. This was because the strengthening economy became an incentive to remain under Ottoman rule as it ensured a sense of security especially during vulnerable periods, such as the war.[xiii] In addition, movements that grew were immediately crushed by the Ottoman army, which the CUP exercised full control over. An example is the Balkan Wars, which ended in Ottoman victory thanks to the efforts of the army.[xiv] Consequently, it is clear that without the empire’s economic and political growth, many nationalist movements may have been unstoppable, thus adding more weight to the significance of these previous factors more than their treatment of nationalist insurgencies. When considering Jeffrey’s stance, however, on the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire which he argues was due to their inability to suppress the nationalist insurgences, it is clear that this is not a factor that can be ignored.[xv]
In conclusion, it is clear that the economic prosperity was the most significant factor behind the Ottoman survival of the collapse of other global empires, as it allowed the empire to continue to reinvest and grow, while also encouraging support for the Ottoman government and crushing any nationalist movements. The dictatorship established by the triumvirate ensured that the authorities had full control over all aspects of the empire, but it was their victory during the Great War that encouraged compliance and support among a large proportion of Ottoman subjects. Without the economic ability to finance their army and prepare for war, winning the war as an uncontested power would have been impossible.
Notes
[i] Richard Harrison, World War One and the New World Order (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p.16. [ii] Treaty of Lausanne, July 24, 1923. [iii] Alfred Jefferson, The Evolution of European Trade in the 20th Century (London: Bloomsbury, 2001), p.103. [iv] Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919. [v] Laura Mathews, Germany: Why Victory was Actually a Defeat in Disguise (New York: Haper Collins, 1970), p. 359. [vi] Lewis Jones, The Ottoman Empire at the Turn of a Century: From a Sultanate to a New Constitution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 91. [vii] Mehmed Rifki, “10 Years After the Three Great Men’s Victory,” Ashab-i Devlet, November 12, 1928, p. 1. [viii] Mustafa Kabasakal, The New Government: The Committee of Union and Progress and the Making of a New Empire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 62. [ix] Haluk Cengiz, The Ottoman Empire: From a Sultanate to a Dictatorship (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), p. 210. [x] Muzaffer Ince, The Ottoman Millet System (London: Penguin Books, 2006), p. 45. [xi] Charles Merriman, Reformation of the Ottoman Empire: The Tanzimat (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 231. [xii] Official Letter from Mehmed Efendi of Serbia to the Ottoman Central Government, May 16, 1900. [xiii] Thomas Hart, Nationalist Insurgence in the Late Ottoman Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 64. [xiv] Thomas Hart, Nationalist Insurgence in the Late Ottoman Empire, p. 95. [xv] Samuel Jeffrey, The Demise of Austria-Hungary (London: Penguin Books, 1979), p. 25. Bibliography
Primary Sources:
Official Letter from Mehmed Efendi of Serbia to the Ottoman Central Government, May 16, 1900
Treaty of Lausanne, July 24, 1923
Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919
Rifki, Mehmed. “10 Years After the Three Great Men’s Victory,” Ashab-i Devlet, November 12, 1928
Secondary Sources:
Cengiz, Haluk. The Ottoman Empire: From a Sultanate to a Dictatorship. London: I.B. Tauris, 2010
Harrison, Richard. World War One and the New World Order. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989
Hart, Thomas. Nationalist Insurgence in the Late Ottoman Empire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000
Ince, Muzaffer. The Ottoman Millet System. London: Penguin Books, 2006
Jefferson, Alfred. The Evolution of European Trade in the 20th Century. London: Bloomsbury, 2001
Jeffrey, Samuel. The Demise of Austria-Hungary. London: Penguin Books, 1979
Jones, Lewis. The Ottoman Empire at the Turn of a Century: From a Sultanate to a New Constitution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993
Kabasakal, Mustafa. The New Government: The Committee of Union and Progress and the Making of a New Empire. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008
Mathews, Laura. Germany: Why Victory was Actually a Defeat in Disguise. New York: HaperCollins, 1970
Merriman, Charles. Reformation of the Ottoman Empire: The Tanzimat. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014
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