By Mazna Khan [Edited by Austin Steele & Carla Norman]
Suez became an excuse, a scapegoat for what was happening to Britain in the world and for all that flowed from the loss of power and economic weakness. -Selwyn Lloyd [1]
The Times magazine pronounced that Eden was ‘the last prime minister to believe Britain was a great power and the first to confront a crisis which proved she was not.’[2] There is certainly truth to this claim when one looks at Eden’s role in the disasters that unravelled during the Suez crisis of 1956. Eden’s belief in the Churchillian illusion of 1918 was at best a gross overestimation of British power and at worst a grave political blunder. The Suez crisis has received much scholarly attention. While it is undoubtedly crucial in the history of Anglo-American relations, closer research reveals it would be wise not to bookmark the event as the single most significant factor in changing the course of Anglo-American relations. Suez remains significant, insofar as showcasing British weakness, but it was not the cause of deteriorating Anglo-American relations nor Britain’s decline as a world power.
This essay falls into three parts: first, Anglo-American relations prior to the crisis show that the relations between Washington and Whitehall were worsening before the crisis and Suez represented the culmination of previous disagreements. Second, this essay seeks to show why Suez happened and what its specifics revealed, which will back the argument that Eden’s role, as Peden has convincingly shown, was contrary to Whitehall’s. Finally, this essay will assess the consequences of Suez and its legacy in the history of Anglo-American relations. This essay will argue that Suez served to display on the explicit surface what was already in motion behind the scenes, the deterioration of British national grandeur. In order to showcase and maintain its imperial integrity, Britain only showed just how subservient it was, and arguably had always been, to America. Suez was significant to the extent that it made the already existing balance of powers visible explicitly. British imperial decline and dependency on America did not begin during Suez, though it certainly became apparent through it.
Historiography surrounding the Suez crisis is vast and extensive. While Scott Lucas and Kyle have contributed an immense corpus of useful literature on the subject, Lucas’s argument that the Suez crisis represented a ‘watershed’ is arguably an overly simplistic claim. Important as the Suez crisis was, the Anglo-American relation ebbed and flowed prior to Suez. Additionally, Britain’s decline in the Middle East was the result of a long process, as such the emphasis on a single event is an injustice to the reality of the situation. The history of Anglo-American relations was always ambiguous and rooted in their respective aims and interests. This leads to the sentiment debate and the extent to which sentiment played a greater role in the history of the ‘special relationship’ as opposed to interests. Although Dumbrell argues for the role of sentiments, it is more convincing to argue that Anglo-American relation was fundamentally rooted in interest. Sentiment no doubt played its part in the relationship, but it always came second to their personal aims and ambitions, a view corroborated by Lucas. Alister Horne recognizes the importance of defence and security against a common enemy as the unifying factor in the relationship, which is certainly proven when one looks at how quickly MacMillan and Eisenhower tried to mend the broken ties after Suez in light of the Soviet threat. Peden and Ashton present the most convincing view of the Suez crisis, offering a revisionist stance on the topic and playing down the notion of the long-lasting significance of Suez. Equipped with the works of Peden and Ashton we gain a clearer view of the Suez crisis, from which we can begin to assess the Anglo-American relation with greater clarity.
In order to understand the importance of the Suez crisis, one must consider the crisis against the backdrop of decolonisation. The struggles of the post-colonial system raised questions such as how international order was to be maintained in a post-colonial world. Anglo American diplomacy was united at times to respond to the changing world, for the most part the ‘special relationship’ was inherently embedded in rivalry and distrust and Suez was one of the many instances which proved this. Undoubtedly, there were instances of cooperation in the relationships, however, this was only due to the Soviet threat. The Suez Canal was lucrative to both nations given that by 1955, British Government figures showed that ninety percent of supplies came from the area.[3] From the period 1917-18, US and British naval forces operated under a joint British command, yet rivalry and distrust still lingered in their relationship.[4] This competition was no doubt also present in the Middle East over the discovery of the flourishing oil reserves. The history of Anglo-American relations reveals there were disagreements between the two nations prior to the crisis of 1956, which is perhaps indicative of the diminishing role of Suez in creating the deeply embedded issues. Scott Lucas has rightly argued that ‘no rhetoric about the special relationship could assure unconditional American support for British interests.’[5] This is best expressed in the Palestinian mandate, Iranian nationalization, Baghdad pact, Buraimi crisis and Suez. These events show that even at the height of the ‘special relationship’, united action was not achieved.[6]
For instance, British and American divergence of views were prevalent in the Arab-Israeli settlement, while America supported Jewish immigration, Britain hoped to convert the mandate into a binational state.[7] This led to increased hostility towards Britain and greater American involvement in the Middle East. Anglo American divisions are further proven by American refusal of the 1955 Baghdad Pact. Britain’s inclusion of Iraq in the Baghdad pact troubled America and prevented them from joining since it would be an offence to Nasser. America also did not want to complicate efforts to resolve Arab-Israeli disputes.[8] Britain, however, aimed to make Iraq the focus of her efforts to protect the oil supplies of the region.[9] American persistency in rejecting the pact reveals their independence from Britain and arguably foreshadows the events in Suez. Furthermore, during the dispute over the Buraimi Oasis, America supported Saudi Arabia while Britain supported the efforts of Muscat and Abu Dhabi. Peterson has argued that the Buraimi crisis was a conflict of interests between Anglo-American diplomats, that in turn led to the rupture of the alliance during Suez.[10] This claim is proven by Eden himself, when he claimed that ‘’the US attitude results from our refusal to give up Buraimi.’’[11] This indicates that Anglo-American policy during Suez was the result of previous disagreements. The role of the Suez crisis in relation to the aforementioned differences appear significant only when one looks at Suez alone. A holistic approach to relations in the Middle East indicates disputes and differences were well underway before Suez. Therefore, the deterioration of Anglo-American relations was not triggered by Suez; though they were further reinforced due to the crisis.
Why, then, was Suez unique in the Anglo-American relation? Prior to Suez, the two powers shared the implementation of policies albeit their differing aims. Suez was unique in that although their aims were united, namely the downfall of Nasser, their respective execution for approaching the perceived threat was divided between the pragmatism of Washington and the stubbornness of Eden. To a large extent, Eden’s diplomacy contributed to the breakdown of Anglo-American relations, since he misjudged the nature of their relationship. American pragmatism angered Eden since it gave the impression that America had changed sides. Nigel Ashton claims that their interests here often failed to coincide.[12] This is certainly true in Suez, hence why both sides felt a sense of betrayal at each other’s approach. Eden was primarily interested in maintaining Britain’s imperial integrity and disappointed by American pragmatism in Egypt, he constantly blamed the US for not having a consistent approach to the Middle East. While America opposed Suez both politically and morally, Eisenhower and Dulles stressed the importance of preventing the Suez crisis from resulting in the expansion of Soviet influence.[13] The Suez crisis also diverted attention away from Soviet action in Hungary in 1956, further angering the US. Anglo-French collusion was nothing short of betrayal for Eisenhower since Eden had failed to take into consideration his oncoming election campaign.
The specifics of Suez reveal that US opposition was more towards Eden and the actions of his closest advisors, and not opposition to Britain itself. Given that, Eden’s role was as Peden has convincingly shown, contrary to wisdom at Whitehall. This is proven by the 1956 policy review which, contrary to Eden’s policy, stressed harmony with America. The policy review shows that Whitehall believed the Anglo-French action was wrong, both because it damaged Anglo-American relations and also due to the moral implications it had.[14] The majority of ministers at Whitehall, unlike Eden, were well aware of the vitalness of America to Britain and their dependency on America.[15] Eden’s successor MacMillan was quick to restore relations with Eisenhower and vice versa, corroborating the fact that US opposition was not opposition to the UK itself. This highlights how Suez merely confirmed Britain’s independence from the US and the lasting effect on the mutual relation was not impaired solely due to Suez.
The Suez crisis was arguably a psychological blow to Britain more than anything else and was but another event which further revealed American independence and Britain’s subservience. The power dynamics between the two allies were brutally displayed at Suez.[16] Given that, in order to bring Britain and France to heel, the Americans contemplated curtailing the oil supplies.[17] Britain simply could not withstand the economic pressure exerted by the US during the crisis.[18] Although the common threat of the Soviet Union brought the two nations together again, Suez reinforced the fact that Britain needed the Anglo-American relation to be maintained, at least on the surface, to survive. The Suez crisis, as mentioned previously, showcased British weakness in comparison to America and reinforced the dependability of Britain. Suez was not, however, the cause of deteriorating Anglo-American relations or Britain’s decline as a world power since this was a long process which had begun prior to the nationalization of Suez and its subsequent consequences. Only a year after Suez, efforts were made to restore the relation by both parties, signifying the short-term impact of Suez in dictating foreign policy between the Atlantic partners.
To conclude, the Suez crisis demonstrated the insecurities of the ‘special relationship’, though it did not create them. On many occasions personal ambitions came before the sentimental rhetoric of the special relationship. Rivalry and suspicion were already deeply inherent in the relationship and would have continued to haunt their diplomacy had Suez never taken place. The Suez crisis has often falsely been pin-pointed as the moment of rupture in the history of Anglo American relations, however, Selwyn Lloyd put it best when he claimed that ‘’Suez became an excuse and a scapegoat for what was happening to Britain in the world and for all that flowed from the loss of power and economic weakness.’’[19]
Footnotes
[1] Selwyn Lloyd, Suez 1956: A Personal Account (London: Cape, 1978), p. 252. [2] Brown, Derek, (2020) “1956: Suez And The End Of Empire”, The Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2001/mar/14/past.education1> [Accessed 14 April 2020]. [3] Nigel J. Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan and the Problem of Nasser Anglo-American Relations and Arab Nationalism, 1955-59 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), p. 12. [4] John Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After (London: Macmillan, 2014), p. 10. [5] W. Scott Lucas, Divided We Stand: Britain, the U.S. and the Suez crisis (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1991), p. ix. [6] William Roger Louis and Hedley Bull (eds.), The Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations Since 1945, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) p. 5. [7] George C. Peden, “Suez and Britain’s Decline as a World Power”, The Historical Journal, 55/4 (2012), p. 1082. [8] Kevin Ruane and James Ellison, “Managing the Americans: Anthony Eden, Harold Macmillan and the Pursuit of ‘Power by Proxy’ in the 1950s”, Contemporary British History, 18/3 (2004) p. 153. [9] Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan and the Problem of Nasser, p. 14. [10] Simon C. Smith (ed.), Reassessing Suez 1956 (Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008), p. 7. [11] Smith, Reassessing Suez, p. 6. [12] Ashton, Eisenhower, Macmillan and the Problem of Nasser, p. 2. [13] Louis and Bull (eds.), The Special Relationship, p. 289 [14] Anthony Adamthwaite, “Suez revisited”, International Affairs, 64/3 (1988), p. 225. [15] Peden, Suez and Britain’s Decline, p. 1075. [16] Dumbrell, A Special Relationship, p. 72. [17] Louis and Bull (eds.), The Special Relationship, p. 276. [18] Dumbrell, A Special Relationship, p. 54. [19] Lloyd, Suez 1956 (London: Cape, 1978), p. 252.
Bibliography
Primary
Lloyd, Selwyn. Suez 1956. A Personal Account. London: Cape, 1978
Secondary
Ashton, Nigel J. Eisenhower, Macmillan and the Problem of Nasser: Anglo-American Relations and Arab Nationalism, 1955-59. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996
Adamthwaite, Anthony. “Suez revisited”. International Affairs. 64/3, 1988
Brown, Derek. “1956: Suez And the End of Empire”. The Guardian, 2020. <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2001/mar/14/past.education1> [Accessed 10 April 2020]
Dobson, Alan and Marsh, Steve. American Foreign Policy Since 1945. London: Routledge, 2001
Dumbrell, John. A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After. London: Macmillan, 2014
Louis, William Roger and Bull, Hedley (eds). The Special Relationship, Anglo-American Relations Since 1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986
Lucas, W Scott. Divided We Stand: Britain, the U.S. and the Suez crisis. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1991
Peden, G C. “Suez and Britain’s Decline as a World Power”. The Historical Journal. 55/4, 2012
Ruane, Kevin and Ellison, James. “Managing the Americans: Anthony Eden, Harold Macmillan and the Pursuit of ‘Power by Proxy’ in the 1950s”, Contemporary British History. 18/3, 2004
Smith, Simon (ed.), Reassessing Suez 1956. Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008